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ABSTRACT
In Bostock v. Clayton County, the Supreme Court held Title VII’s
prohibition on sex-based employment discrimination applies to
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.
Although the opinion is an important victory, if history is any guide,
Bostock was only one battle in a larger war against invidious
workplace discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender
identity. Prejudiced employers and managers will seek alternative, less
obvious ways to discriminate. Judges and civil rights lawyers must
prepare themselves to recognize and reject pretextual rationales for
adverse actions taken against lesbian, gay, and bisexual employees. A
better understanding of history can inform those efforts.
This Article examines an unexplored chapter in the United States’
history of anti-gay discrimination in the workplace: punishing gay
workers for concealing their sexual orientation. Beginning in the 1960s,
as federal and state law implemented procedural protections for publicsector workers, employers developed a new mechanism to evade those
protections: the gay perjury trap. At its core, the strategy is simple. An
employer asks job applicants about their sexual orientation. If they
reveal that they are gay, decline to hire them. If gay workers conceal
their sexual orientation and it is later discovered, terminate them for
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their dishonesty. Either way, gay workers are purged from the
workforce.
This Article provides historical examples of the federal government
and local school districts using this strategy to terminate highperforming workers who were later discovered to be gay. After
discussing the inherent unfairness of the gay perjury trap, this Article
explains how prejudiced employers may attempt to deploy this strategy
as a means of circumventing Title VII liability in the post-Bostock era.
Finally, this Article discusses how courts should prevent employers
from using the gay perjury trap in the post-Bostock work environment.
Dismantling the gay perjury trap entails three components. First, courts
should interpret Title VII as prohibiting employers from inquiring
about an applicant’s or employee’s sexual orientation. Second, courts
should not afford employers a general right to penalize gay workers for
concealing or misrepresenting their sexual orientation. Third, courts
should construe Title VII to protect employees who refuse to answer
questions about their sexual orientation.
Whether Title VII can effectively deter and remedy anti-gay
discrimination will in significant part depend on courts’ ability to
recognize and prohibit employers from using the gay perjury trap. The
post-Bostock Title VII cannot succeed if employers can use alleged
dishonesty about sexual orientation as a means of punishing gay
workers and avoiding liability.
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Thus if [a gay man] dares to show his true inclinations, there is awaiting
the road of the outcast—discrimination, social ostracism, economic
defeat. And if, in self-protection, he is forced to make a pretense, there
comes denunciation for living a life that is a lie!
—Donald Webster Cory, 19511

INTRODUCTION
After graduating from The Pennsylvania State University (“Penn
State”) in the early 1970s, Joseph Acanfora III achieved his goal of
becoming a science teacher.2 Pennsylvania officials had delayed a
decision on his application for a teaching certificate. So Acanfora
secured a job teaching science at a junior high school in Montgomery
County, Maryland. The school district was happy with Acanfora’s
performance. But after Acanfora was settled in his new job,
Pennsylvania’s secretary of education took the unusual action of

1. DONALD WEBSTER CORY, THE HOMOSEXUAL IN AMERICA: A SUBJECTIVE
APPROACH 47 (1951).
2. Acanfora v. Bd. of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843, 844–45 (D. Md. 1973), aff’d, 491 F.2d 498
(4th Cir. 1974). The facts of the Acanfora case are fully discussed and cited infra notes 118–48 and
the accompanying text.
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holding a press conference to announce that Acanfora’s application for
teacher certification would be approved despite his homosexuality.
The public stunt seemed designed to sully Acanfora’s reputation, not
to reward him with his hard-earned teaching certificate. Upon learning
that Acanfora was gay, the Montgomery County deputy
superintendent of schools removed him from the classroom. Acanfora
discussed the school district’s actions against him on 60 Minutes, the
Public Broadcasting Service (“PBS”), and other television news
programs. In response, the school refused to renew his contract.
When Acanfora challenged his removal from the classroom,
courts informed school district officials that they could not punish
Acanfora for his media appearances. The officials came up with a
different reason to remove him from his prized teaching position: when
Acanfora applied for his teaching job, he had not disclosed to the
school district his prior membership in a gay student organization at
Penn State. The officials admitted that they would not have hired
Acanfora if he had disclosed his affiliation—and, thus, his sexual
orientation. Instead of defending its anti-gay policy, however, the
school district attacked Acanfora as dishonest. And the Fourth Circuit
concurred, holding that the school district could justify taking adverse
action against Acanfora for not listing his membership even though the
officials did not know about Acanfora’s omission when they punished
him.3 Acanfora became one of the early prominent victims of the “gay
perjury trap,” a Kafkaesque device in which gay people are denied
employment if they disclose their sexual orientation, but are
terminated for mendacity if their employer discovers that they
concealed their sexual orientation. This Article tells the history of the
gay perjury trap and its relevance in the modern era.
For most of the twentieth century, institutionalized homophobia
made it difficult for millions of gay individuals to secure and retain
meaningful employment across the United States. Major employers
engaged in witch hunts designed to identify and punish lesbian, gay,
and bisexual (“LGB”) people.4 Government employers—most notably
3. Acanfora, 491 F.2d at 503.
4. Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by “Unenforced”
Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 137–38 (2000) [hereinafter Leslie, Creating
Criminals]; Nancy J. Knauer, Science, Identity, and the Construction of the Gay Political Narrative,
12 LAW & SEXUALITY 1, 20 (2003); Carlos A. Ball, Obscenity, Morality, and the First Amendment:
The First LGBT Rights Cases Before the Supreme Court, 28 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 229, 264
(2015).
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the military, federal security agencies, and local police and fire
departments—maintained official policies of terminating all known
gay workers.5 Public schools prohibited gay people from working as
teachers.6 Many private employers, too, had policies against hiring gay
employees.7
Because sexual orientation is not a visible characteristic, many gay
people can “pass” as heterosexual. Historically, most had to do so to
earn an income. Both government and private employers sought to
root out gay people by asking job applicants and current employees
about their sexual orientation. Many employers administered
psychological tests and lie detector tests to identify gay people.8 Once
detected, gay applicants were rejected, and gay workers were subject
to termination, harassment, transfer, or demotion.
By 2020, as more Americans came to understand the toll and the
irrationality of anti-gay discrimination, almost half of the states
included sexual orientation protections in their employment
nondiscrimination laws. That year, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Bostock v. Clayton County9 expanded such protections nationwide
when the six-to-three majority interpreted Title VII’s federal
prohibition on sex-based employment discrimination to bar
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.10

5. See ROBIN A. BUHRKE, A MATTER OF JUSTICE: LESBIANS AND GAY MEN IN LAW
ENFORCEMENT 26, 118 (1996); Leslie, Creating Criminals, supra note 4, at 137–39.
6. See, e.g., Rowland v. Mad River Loc. Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444, 446 (6th Cir. 1984);
Gaylord v. Tacoma Sch. Dist., 559 P.2d 1340, 1341 (Wash. 1977); see also Christopher R. Leslie,
The Geography of Equal Protection, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1579, 1615 (2017) [hereinafter Leslie,
Geography of Equal Protection] (“Local school districts routinely discriminate against teachers
and school administrators.”).
7. See David E. Morrison, You’ve Built the Bridge, Why Don’t You Cross It? A Call for
State Labor Laws Prohibiting Private Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual
Orientation, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 245, 258–59 (1992).
8. See infra notes 20–22 and accompanying text.
9. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
10. Id. at 1741. Although Bostock applied Title VII to both sexual orientation and gender
identity, this Article focuses on a form of discrimination that was historically targeted against gay
workers. Sexual orientation discrimination has its own unique history and some of this Article’s
reasoning does not map neatly onto gender identity. Employment discrimination based on gender
identity is invidious and should be deterred and penalized in the post-Bostock era. Some (but not
all) of the Article’s reasoning may apply to gender identity, which is discussed at infra notes 228
to 231 and accompanying text. The issue of how employers may try to evade Title VII’s
application to transgender workers—and how to identify and prevent such circumvention—is an
important topic that warrants its own article.

LESLIE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

6

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

9/16/2021 4:16 PM

[Vol. 71:1

Bringing gay employees within the protection of Title VII
represents a major achievement. But, if history is any guide, Bostock
was just one battle in a larger war against invidious workplace
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. Just as
the enactment of Title VII did not eliminate racial and gender
discrimination, the Supreme Court’s recognition that Title VII protects
gay workers is not a panacea. The ultimate impact of Bostock will
largely be a function of two related reactions to the opinion: how
prejudiced employers attempt to circumvent the decision, and how
robustly courts interpret Title VII’s application to gay employees.
Before Bostock, employers in half of the states could legally fire
or refuse to hire lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender (“LGBT”)
people.11 In the absence of legal protections, many employers exercised
their prejudice openly. The former bosses of Gerald Bostock, Donald
Zarda, and Aimee Stephens, the named employees in the three
separate cases that the Supreme Court consolidated in the Bostock
opinion, certainly did so.12 These cases were by no means aberrations;
employers have routinely fired, refused to hire, or otherwise
discriminated against gay workers.13
The Bostock opinion will do little to quench prejudiced
employers’ urges to discriminate based on sexual orientation and
gender identity. Those individuals with hiring and firing authority who
wish to purge gay workers from their payrolls will try to circumvent
Title VII’s application to sexual orientation via alternative, less
obvious means of discrimination. Long before Bostock, employers
fashioned pretextual reasons for terminating gay employees.14 The
Bostock opinion will undoubtedly reinvigorate such gamesmanship.
11.

KERITH J. CONRON & SHOSHANA K. GOLDBERG, THE WILLIAMS INST., LGBT PEOPLE
US NOT PROTECTED BY STATE NON-DISCRIMINATION STATUTES 2–3 (2020),
https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/LGBT-ND-Protections-Update-Apr2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZKP-A47U].
12. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737–38.
13. See BRAD SEARS & CHRISTY MALLORY, THE WILLIAMS INST., DOCUMENTED
EVIDENCE OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION & ITS EFFECTS ON LGBT PEOPLE 1 (2011),
https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Effects-LGBT-Employ-Discrim-Jul2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/97NV-HQQK] (finding that over 37 percent of gay workers who were
out at work suffered sexual orientation discrimination in the previous five years). One 2014 study
found that “more qualified LGBT applicants were 23 percent less likely to be called back for
interviews than less qualified non-LGBT applicants.” Federal Contractors Show Anti-LGBT
Hiring
Bias,
EQUAL
RTS.
C T R ., https://equalrightscenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/freedom_to_work_6_16_14.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7PD-WJTT].
14. See infra notes 203–06 and accompanying text.
IN THE
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Judges and civil rights lawyers must prepare to recognize and reject
pretextual rationales for adverse actions taken against gay employees.
History can inform those efforts to prevent and remedy more
subtle discrimination based on sexual orientation. Ensuring that Title
VII will protect gay workers against invidious discrimination requires
a solid understanding of how employers exercised their anti-gay
prejudice in the pre-Bostock era. Decades before Bostock provided
substantive nondiscrimination protections by interpreting Title VII to
prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender
identity, federal law provided procedural and other protections to
government employees.15 Government employers nonetheless
circumvented these legal safeguards and continued to improperly
terminate gay employees. In all likelihood, bigoted employers will
attempt to similarly evade Title VII.
This Article identifies one particularly insidious method that
employers have historically used to discriminate against gay workers:
the gay perjury trap.16 The gay perjury trap refers to situations in which
employers inquire about job applicants’ sexual orientation in order to
force gay people into a bind. Applicants who identify themselves as gay
are denied employment, generally without explanation. Gay applicants
may therefore seek to conceal their sexual orientation, and, if
successful, they may be hired. Prejudiced employers may have more
difficulty terminating a gay employee, or taking other adverse actions,
if they do not discover that worker’s sexual orientation until after the
worker is hired, particularly if the worker has established an exemplary
record. A gay applicant who successfully conceals their sexual
orientation and receives the job may, for example, be entitled to certain
procedural protections. If, however, that employee lied during the
application process by misrepresenting their sexual orientation, the
misrepresentation provides the pretext for termination.
Part I of this Article describes the gay perjury trap, examines
historical examples, and discusses why employers have used the trap
against gay members of the labor force. At its core, the gay perjury trap
is simple: Ask job applicants about their sexual orientation. If they
reveal their sexual orientation, decline to hire them. If they conceal

15. See infra notes 27–28 and accompanying text.
16. Traditionally, a perjury trap refers to the situation “when the government calls a witness
before the grand jury for the primary purpose of obtaining testimony from him in order to
prosecute him later for perjury.” United States v. Chen, 933 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1991).
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their sexual orientation and it is later discovered, terminate them for
lying.17 Either way, gay workers are purged from the workforce.
Part II explains how the historical cases presented in Part I remain
relevant post-Bostock. The days of employers investigating the sexual
orientation of applicants and employees may seem relegated to the
past. But those days are now, and employers continue to set the trap.
Given the intensity of anti-gay prejudice in some regions and
employers, the Bostock opinion is unlikely to end employment
discrimination against gay workers. As with other antidiscrimination
regimes, employers determined to discriminate against gay workers
will search for ways to evade the law, such as the gay perjury trap. The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), the courts,
and civil rights lawyers must prepare to recognize and respond to these
attempts.
Part III discusses how courts should prevent employers from using
the gay perjury trap in the post-Bostock work environment.
Dismantling the gay perjury trap entails three components. First,
courts should interpret Title VII as prohibiting employers from
inquiring about sexual orientation. Second, courts should not afford
employers a general right to penalize gay workers for concealing or
misrepresenting their sexual orientation. Even in an era in which Title
VII applies to sexual orientation, millions of gay Americans will remain
closeted in their workplaces. Third, courts should construe Title VII to
protect employees who refuse to answer questions about their sexual
orientation. Ultimately, courts should be suspicious of employers who
justify adverse employment decisions on the grounds of a worker’s
misrepresentation of—or refusal to discuss—sexual orientation.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE GAY PERJURY TRAP
From the beginning of the modern gay rights movement,
employers have utilized gay perjury traps to discriminate based on
sexual orientation. The trap involves three components. First, the
employer sets the trap by asking job applicants about their sexual

17. Deception is not perjury unless the falsehood is told under oath. Some employment
applications are, in fact, signed under penalty of perjury. See Hargett v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 640
F. Supp. 2d 450, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Hargett v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 381 F.
App’x 12 (2d Cir. 2010). Some inquiries into a current employee’s sexual orientation require the
employee to sign official forms that state a failure to answer all questions fully and truthfully will
result in dismissal. See, e.g., FRANK BUTTINO, A SPECIAL AGENT: GAY AND INSIDE THE FBI 95
(1993). In others, the inquiry is less formal.
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orientation. This can be done directly or indirectly through proxy
questions, such as asking an applicant to identify any organizations of
which she has been a member. The employer declines to hire any
applicant who identifies as gay, lesbian, or bisexual. Second, the
employer springs the trap by terminating any employee who is later
discovered to have concealed their sexual orientation during the
application process. In doing so, the employer asserts that the
termination is because the applicant lied, not because of their sexual
orientation. Third, the employer prevents gay workers from evading
the trap by refusing to hire anyone who will not answer questions about
sexual orientation. Part I discusses each of these steps in turn.
A. Setting the Gay Perjury Trap
The first step of the gay perjury trap entails employers inquiring
into all job applicants’ sexuality. In the past, those applicants who did
not represent themselves as heterosexual did not receive job offers.
This was official government policy during the Cold War when federal,
state, and local governments all implemented anti-gay employment
policies.18 Because government agencies discriminated against gay
individuals and “[l]icensing boards restricted homosexuals from many
occupations, and private employers banned homosexuals officially or
unofficially[,] . . . lesbians and gay men were officially barred from at
least 20 percent of the nation’s jobs.”19 This system prevented millions
of gay people from practicing their professions.
Understanding this situation, yet needing a paycheck, gay workers
concealed their sexual orientation. Employers responded by trying to
identify the gay people in their midst through a variety of techniques,
including questionnaires, lie detector tests, arrest records, and
organizational affiliations. This section reviews those methods.
1. Direct Questioning. Perhaps the most straightforward method
of determining an individual’s sexual orientation is to ask them. And
during the McCarthy era, the federal government did just that. The
State Department’s fixation on gay men became an obsession. In his
18.

See DAVID K. JOHNSON, LAVENDER SCARE: THE COLD WAR PERSECUTION OF GAYS

AND LESBIANS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 147–78 (2004).

19. Gregory B. Lewis, Lifting the Ban on Gays in the Civil Service: Federal Policy Toward
Gay and Lesbian Employees Since the Cold War, 57 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 387, 389 (1997)
[hereinafter Lewis, Lifting the Ban] (citing ALLAN BÉRUBÉ, COMING OUT UNDER FIRE: THE
HISTORY OF GAY MEN AND WOMEN IN WORLD WAR II 269–70 (20th ed. 1990)).
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study of anti-gay federal policies during this period, Professor David
Johnson explained: “All male applicants were subject to a personal
interview by security personnel who specialized in uncovering
homosexuals. If suspicions were raised, the applicant would be given a
lie detector test.”20 Those who confessed to homosexual activity were
denied jobs.21 In 1960, the State Department rejected almost one-third
of all job applicants due to suspected homosexuality following
questioning and investigation.22
Long after Senator Joseph McCarthy had been exposed as a
dangerous fraud, federal anti-gay policies continued in full force.
Under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, all applicants for
federal jobs were asked “Have you ever had, or have you now,
homosexual tendencies?” as part of their medical history on the
Standard Form 89.23 Those who answered in the affirmative were
denied employment.24
The government’s inquiry was often more intrusive than a single
question about an individual’s sexual orientation. An applicant
suspected of homosexuality could face “five pages of highly invasive
interrogatories about his sexual life,” including explicit questions about
oral sex, anal sex, “and how many times and with how many people he
might have engaged in these acts and where, when, and how these acts
might have occurred.”25 The questions appeared designed to humiliate
suspected gay people, rather than to officially discern their sexual
orientation.
After they hired job applicants, federal employers continued their
hunt for gay people who made it through the initial filters calibrated to
create heterosexual-only workplaces. In the early 1970s, the Civil
Service Commission (“the Commission”) spent $12 million—over $80
million in current value—annually to investigate charges that civil

20. JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 72–73.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 197.
23. Id. at 196.
24. Id.; cf. id. at 197 (“Testifying before a House appropriations subcommittee in 1966,
William Crockett, deputy undersecretary of state, testified that all male applicants to the department were asked directly, ‘Have you ever engaged in a homosexual act?’”).
25. GENNY BEEMYN, A QUEER CAPITAL: A HISTORY OF GAY LIFE IN WASHINGTON, D.C.
189 (2015).
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servants were gay.26 By the end of 1973, the Commission began to
adopt modest protections for gay workers when it
issued a bulletin to all agencies stating that [it] could not “find a
person unsuitable for Federal employment merely because that
person is a homosexual,” but that [it] could dismiss or refuse to hire a
person whose “homosexual conduct affects job fitness—excluding
from such considerations, however, unsubstantiated conclusions
concerning possible embarrassment to the Federal service.”27

The policy, however, was often honored in the breach.28
Importantly, the new policy did not apply to the intelligence
agencies.29 Consequently, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”)
continued to ask its applicants if they were gay and reject them if they
answered affirmatively, regardless of their qualifications. Dana Tillson
applied for a special agent position with the FBI in 1987; after her
interview, she was informed that “she was the highest-rated female
applicant in San Francisco and that she would be hired assuming her
background investigation was satisfactory.”30 The FBI subsequently
rejected Tillson’s application when she truthfully responded to the
interviewers’ inquiries about her sexual orientation, acknowledging
that she “engage[d] in private sexual conduct with consenting adult
women.”31 In another example, when one Midwestern applicant with a
graduate degree and an honorable discharge from the military
interviewed to be a special agent, the FBI interviewer asked the
applicant why he had left the military.32 Upon the FBI hopeful
responding that he left because he was gay, the FBI agent replied: “The
FBI does not hire second-class citizens.”33 The agent was too modest
about the FBI’s influence. The FBI did not merely shun second-class
citizens; it created them.
By classifying Americans based on their sexual orientation and
aggressively discriminating against gay Americans, the FBI sought to
26. Lewis, Lifting the Ban, supra note 19, at 392.
27. Id. at 392–93.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 393; see BEEMYN, supra note 25, at 190 (noting that “the guidelines did not apply
to the FBI, CIA, and Foreign Service, which continued to have employment policies and practices
that discriminated against gay people until the 1990s”).
30. Buttino v. FBI, 801 F. Supp. 298, 310 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (citation omitted).
31. Id.
32. BUTTINO, supra note 17, at 289.
33. Id.
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stigmatize LGB applicants as deviant and un-American. The FBI also
applied its anti-gay policy to its own agents after years of loyal
employment.34 While officials sought to proffer legitimate rationales
for their anti-gay policies, the FBI’s targeting was always driven by “an
overarching and intense fear and loathing of gays”—or, in Professor
Douglas Charles’s words, “an irrepressible animus.”35
The federal government was not alone in asking job applicants
about their sexual orientation. State governments pursued similar
policies.36 During the height of the Cold War, for example, the state of
Florida actively hunted for gay and lesbian teachers in an attempt to
remove them from classrooms.37 A state committee hired a team of
investigators to collect the sexual histories of teachers suspected of
homosexuality.38
Local governments, too, utilized anti-gay screens. During the
1970s, New York’s Suffolk County required job applicants to fill out a
questionnaire that inquired, “Homosexual Tendencies: yes or no.”39 At
the end of the twentieth century, police departments continued to ask
applicants about sexual orientation in order to weed out gay men and
lesbians. In Connecticut, John Doe achieved the highest score of
anyone taking the Hamden Police Department qualifying exam in

34.
35.

See, e.g., id. at 94–95.
DOUGLAS M. CHARLES, HOOVER’S WAR ON GAYS: EXPOSING THE FBI’S “SEX
DEVIATES” PROGRAM xv (2015).
36. See JOHN D’EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A
HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1970 213 (2d ed. 1998); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of “Coming Out”: Religion, Homosexuality, and Collisions of
Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411, 2425 (1997) (“State and
federal governments invested substantial resources in campaigns to search out and expose
homosexuals in big cities, in the armed forces, and in state and federal employment.”).
37. See JUDITH G. POUCHER, STATE OF DEFIANCE: CHALLENGING THE JOHNS
COMMITTEE’S ASSAULT ON CIVIL LIBERTIES 86–109 (2014).
38. Stacy Braukman, “Nothing Else Matters but Sex”: Cold War Narratives of Deviance and
the Search for Lesbian Teachers in Florida, 1959-1963, 27 FEMINIST STUD. 553, 559 (2001); see also
id. at 568 (“The interview began with the basic facts of the witness’s life—full name, age,
educational background, and employment history. But the inquisitor wasted little time in getting
to the point, asking some variation of ‘Have you ever been involved in any type of homosexual
activity?’”).
39. BRAD SEARS, NAN D. HUNTER & CHRISTY MALLORY, THE WILLIAMS INST.,
DOCUMENTING DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY IN
STATE EMPLOYMENT 5-33 (2009) (footnote omitted), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wpcontent/uploads/ENDA-5-History-Sep-2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/SRW8-6KRZ].
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1994.40 Because of Doe’s exam score, physical condition, and grades in
a graduate-level criminal justice program, the department offered
“conditional employment” as a police officer, subject to Doe
completing psychological, medical, and polygraph examinations,
during which the polygraph examiner asked Doe’s sexual orientation.41
After Doe answered truthfully, the polygraph report led with the
statement “He is gay,” and Hamden’s police chief announced that Doe
was not the “best candidate for the job.”42 Similarly, the Dallas Police
Department maintained a policy of asking job applicants their sexual
orientation and rejecting otherwise qualified applicants who answered
they were gay or lesbian.43 Such anti-gay policies were common for
police departments in both major cities and small towns.44
Private employers, too, asked applicants about their sexual
orientation. In the 1990s, Target Stores required applicants for security
officer positions to answer a series of true-or-false questions, including
“I am very strongly attracted by members of my own sex.”45 Other job
applicants asked about their sexual orientation include pharmacists,

40. Id. at 12-50 (citing HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN FOUND., DOCUMENTING DISCRIMINATION:
A SPECIAL REPORT FROM THE HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FEATURING CASES OF
DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION IN AMERICA’S WORKPLACES (2001),
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/ENDA-12-Examples-Sep-2009.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5TDN-W6TW]).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. For example, in City of Dallas v. England,
England applied for a position with the Dallas Police Department in 1989. She was
invited to interview for the position and, when asked about her sexual orientation, she
responded truthfully that she was a lesbian. The interviewer then informed England
that under the police department’s hiring policy her homosexuality made her ineligible
for employment.
846 S.W.2d 957, 958 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (footnote omitted); see also Childers v. Dall. Police
Dept., 513 F. Supp. 134, 136 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (declining to hire an applicant who, in response to
a question from an interviewer, identified himself as gay), aff’d mem., 669 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1982).
44. See, e.g., Leslie, Creating Criminals, supra note 4, at 143 (“Police departments
traditionally discriminate against gay men and lesbians both in hiring and promotion decisions in
ways that affect both police officers and administrators.”); Woodland v. City of Hous., 940 F.2d
134, 137 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting how the City of Houston’s Police Department, Fire Department,
and Airport Police Division asked job applicants about “homosexual behavior” during mandatory
polygraph exams); see also Christopher R. Leslie, Lawrence v. Texas as the Perfect Storm, 38 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 509, 513 (2005) [hereinafter Leslie, Perfect Storm] (“Police departments and
prosecutors’ offices refused to hire gay men and lesbians, reasoning that sodomy laws rendered
them criminals, and criminals could not be hired in any field related to law enforcement.”).
45. Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, 79–80 (Ct. App. 1991), dismissed as
moot in accordance with the parties’ stipulation, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 587 (Nov. 10, 1993).
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police officers, teachers,46 coaches, camp counselors,47 administrators,
clerical workers, health program coordinators,48 software development
administrators,49 and even professional football players.50
Today, major employers continue to ask applicants and employees
about their sexual orientation in order to discriminate against gay job
candidates or employees.51 The discrimination can take the form of
being denied a new job or being terminated from an existing job.52 In
one of the more infamous anti-gay purges by an American company,
the Cracker Barrel restaurant chain announced an official policy for its
one hundred restaurants in the 1990s: it refused “to continue to employ
individuals . . . whose sexual preferences fail to demonstrate normal
heterosexual values.”53 To implement this policy, “[t]hroughout the
chain, individual store managers, acting on orders of corporate
officials, began conducting brief, one-on-one interviews with their
employees to see if any were in violation of the new policy.”54

46.
47.

See Jantz v. Muci, 976 F.2d 623, 626 (10th Cir. 1992).
See Jennifer Levitz, Fundraiser Puts Scout Policy on Gays Back in Spotlight,
PROVIDENCE J., Oct. 1, 1999, at A1 (“The local scouting organization came under attack this
summer when officials fired an Eagle Scout from his job at Camp Yawgoog after his boss asked
him if he was gay, and he said yes.”).
48. See Klimer v. Haymarket/Maryville, No. 91-E-117, 1993 WL 839792, at *1 (Chi. Comm’n
on Hum. Rels., June 16, 1993).
49. See Kemba J. Dunham, Stay-at-Home Dads Fight Stigma, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 26, 2003,
12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB106184492170212200.html [https://perma.cc/ZU4R-9H8J].
50. In 2010, the Cincinnati Bengals asked a draft prospect to disclose his sexual orientation
before being drafted. Team Executives Ask NFL Draft Prospects the Darnedest Things, NFL (May
10, 2010, 11:15 AM), https://www.nfl.com/news/team-executives-ask-nfl-draft-prospects-thedarnedest-things-09000d5d817f452b [https://perma.cc/N98Q-FLM3]; Another Fun Rookie
Interview Question: Sexual Orientation, NBC SPORTS (May 5, 2010, 4:44 PM),
https://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2010/05/05/another-fun-rookie-interview-question-sexualorientation [https://perma.cc/5H54-4KC5].
51. See infra notes 220–25 and accompanying text; see also Gregory B. Lewis, Barriers to
Security Clearances for Gay Men and Lesbians: Fear of Blackmail or Fear of Homosexuals?, 11 J.
PUB. ADMIN. RSCH. & THEORY 539, 551 (2001) (noting that interviewers “who said that
homosexual relations were always wrong were nearly three times as likely as those who said they
were not wrong at all to say the government definitely should have the right to ask detailed,
personal questions about sexual orientation”).
52. See Hyman v. City of Louisville, 132 F. Supp. 2d 528, 532 (W.D. Ky. 2001) (“As a part
of the hiring process, Dr. Hyman is said to have inquired into two applicants’ sexual orientation
intending to take this fact into account in reaching an employment decision.”), vacated on standing
grounds, 53 F. App’x 740 (6th Cir. 2002).
53. John Howard, The Cracker Barrel Restaurants, in UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGING
DIVERSITY 166, 167 (Carol P. Harvey & M. June Allard eds., 6th ed. 2015) (alteration in original).
54. Id.
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Employees who answered truthfully that they were gay were
terminated on the spot without any severance.55
For many employees, someone other than a boss or supervisor
may inquire into sexual orientation in the workplace. For example,
coworkers have asked fellow employees whether they were gay.56
These inquiries into sexual orientation often arise in the context of
anti-gay slurs being hurled at an employee.57 In this scenario, the
employee is subjected to a combination of verbal assault and sexual
inquisition.58 The question can also come from nonemployees, such as
students in educational settings.59 Whatever the source of the question
about homosexuality, if answered affirmatively, the gay worker is
subject to harassment and termination.
It is hardly surprising that in the years before the Stonewall riots
and during the first decades of the modern gay rights movement
employers sought to identify and discriminate against LGB individuals.
Public and private employers alike asked both broadly worded and
offensively pointed questions regarding sexuality. When asked about
sexual orientation, gay people had a choice: tell the truth and be denied
a job, or lie. Many lied. If one needed the job, lying was the rational
decision. But this meant one got the job based on a lie—a lie that could
come back to haunt the employee.

55. See id. Some employees weren’t even asked; they were just terminated for being gay.
Michael Cunningham, If You’re Queer and You’re Not Angry in 1992, You’re Not Paying
Attention; If You’re Straight It May be Hard to Figure Out What All the Shouting’s About., 17
MOTHER JONES 60, 64 (1992) (“In all, eighteen lesbians and gay men were fired from Cracker
Barrel’s outlets. Some managers called the employees they suspected into their offices and
formally asked if they were homosexual. Others just convened staff meetings and announced that
certain employees were being terminated in accordance with company policy.”).
56. Bryan v. Mem’l Sloan-Kettering Cancer Ctr., OATH Index No. 183/06 (N.Y.C. Comm’n
on Hum. Rts. July 25, 2006), 2006 WL 6632708, at *4 (N.Y.C. Comm’n on Hum. Rts. July 25,
2006) (describing police officers asking their fellow officers whether they were gay), aff’d,
Comm’n Decision (Sept. 29, 2006); STEPHEN LEINEN, GAY COPS 49 (1993).
57. See Bahena v. Adjustable Clamp Co., No. 99-E-111, 2003 WL 23529561, at *3 & *6 (Chi.
Comm’n on Hum. Rels. July 16, 2003) (observing coworkers asking another employee whom they
suspected of being gay “why he was” gay).
58. See, e.g., Fontánez-Núñez v. Janssen Ortho LLC, 447 F.3d 50, 53 (1st Cir. 2006)
(“According to Fontánez, Natal also made offensive comments referencing homosexual activity,
once noting that Fontánez was a pharmacist and expressing an opinion, in vulgar terms, that all
pharmacists are homosexuals. Fontánez stated that co-workers would then call him (Fontánez)
gay or would ask him whether he was gay.”).
59. KIM I. MILLS WITH DARYL HERRSCHAFT, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN FOUND., THE STATE
OF THE WORKPLACE FOR LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDERED AMERICANS 25
(1999).
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2. Arrest Records. Historically, some employers justified their
inquiries into homosexuality as part of a larger inquiry into applicants’
criminal activities. At the beginning of the gay rights movement, all
state penal codes contained statutes that proscribed private consensual
sodomy between adults.60 Although criminal charges were not widely
prosecuted—due primarily to the private nature of the illegal
conduct—police often used sodomy laws to arrest people suspected of
being gay.61 Police departments in many jurisdictions executed sting
operations employing decoys—cops who pretended to be gay in an
effort to convince gay men to make passes, at which time they would
be arrested for soliciting illegal sex.62 Other arrests were not for actual
sexual activity or solicitation, but for visiting a gay bar, innocently
touching or dancing with a member of the same sex, or anything else
that a police officer considered “indecent.”63 In other words, arrests
were not necessarily for illegal sexual conduct, but rather for any
observed indicator of homosexuality. LGBT historian Eric Cervini
reports on this period: “After World War II, homosexual arrests—
including those for sodomy, dancing, kissing, or holding hands—
occurred at a rate of one every ten minutes, each hour, each day, for
fifteen years. In sum, one million citizens found themselves persecuted
by the American state for sexual deviation.”64
Police departments maintained vice squads whose sole function
was to find and expose gay men. For example, during the post-war era,
Washington, D.C., employed a so-called “morals squad” of four
policemen working full-time to detect and arrest gay men.65 Some

60. Leslie, Creating Criminals, supra note 4, at 106.
61. Id. at 127–35.
62. NAN ALAMILLA BOYD, WIDE OPEN TOWN: A HISTORY OF QUEER SAN FRANCISCO TO
1965, at 137–38, 207–08 (2003); Leslie, Creating Criminals, supra note 4, at 131–32. See generally
JOHN GERASSI, BOYS OF BOISE: FUROR, VICE, AND FOLLY IN AN AMERICAN CITY (1966)
(discussing use of anti-gay police stings in Boise, Idaho during the 1950s); MARTIN S. WEINBERG
& COLIN J. WILLIAMS, MALE HOMOSEXUALS: THEIR PROBLEMS AND ADAPTATIONS 48 (1974)
(noting that the California criminal statute was used “frequently in connection with arrests
involving the soliciting of decoys by homosexuals”). These tactics continue today. See infra note
298.
63. Lewis, Lifting the Ban, supra note 19, at 389; BOYD, supra note 62, at 137–38.
64. ERIC CERVINI, THE DEVIANT’S WAR: THE HOMOSEXUAL VS. THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 4 (2020).
65. Lewis, Lifting the Ban, supra note 19, at 388.
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officials complained that this number was insufficient to confront the
“homosexual menace.”66
Several vice squads existed primarily to create arrest records used
to terminate gay men from federal employment.67 D.C. police officials
estimated that the nation’s capital was home to five thousand gay men,
three-fourths of whom worked for the federal government.68 These
officials saw reducing that percentage as part of their mission. Local
law enforcement, the FBI, and the Civil Service Commission worked
in tandem to eliminate gay people from the federal workforce. The
Commission chairman
suggested that if local police departments would report all morals
arrests with sufficient detail to the FBI, then the FBI could give the
information to the Civil Service Commission. The commission could
then pass the information on to relevant agencies to remove current
employees, and the FBI could maintain the lists so that job applicants
could be screened against them. Indeed, [one D.C. police lieutenant]
testified that he was already furnishing names and fingerprints of all
morals arrests to the FBI.69

For example, in 1963, the D.C. morals squad arrested National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (“NASA”) budget analyst
Clifford Norton for allegedly picking up another man in Lafayette
Circle.70 The police, unbeknownst to Norton, brought NASA’s security
chief to observe their interrogation.71 Norton was subsequently
transferred to NASA headquarters and questioned for several more
hours, through the night until 6:30 in the morning, about his sexual
orientation.72 Despite a fifteen-year record of unblemished
government service, NASA fired Norton for his “immoral, indecent

66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
See JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 138.
Lewis, Lifting the Ban, supra note 19, at 388.
Id.; see also LISA KEEN & SUZANNE B. GOLDBERG, STRANGERS TO THE LAW: GAY
PEOPLE ON TRIAL 84 (1998) (noting that the FBI turned over the names of suspected
homosexuals to the U.S. Civil Service Commission, which used the information to terminate gay
employees).
70. Lewis, Lifting the Ban, supra note 19, at 391; CERVINI, supra note 64, at 303.
71. Id.
72. Id.; David K. Johnson, “Homosexual Citizens”: Washington’s Gay Community
Confronts the Civil Service, WASH. HIST., Fall/Winter, 1994–1995, at 44, 45 [hereinafter Johnson,
Homosexual Citizens]; see Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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and disgraceful conduct.”73 Gay men who confessed their sexual
orientation during such an interrogation were summarily fired, no
matter how valuable their service or skill set, even when their bosses
supported them.74 Government investigators used this basic process of
interrogation against thousands of gay civil servants in the nation’s
capital, almost all of whom “resigned” quietly in the hopes of perhaps
finding a job in another city where their sexual orientation was
unknown.75
While the D.C. morals squad inflicted the most damage, many
cities followed its lead by maintaining anti-gay squads.76 The linkage
between arrest and job termination was, in fact, a national
phenomenon. Professor John D’Emilio explains that the FBI
took the initiative of establishing liaison with police departments
throughout the country. Not content with acting only on requests to
screen particular individuals, it adopted a preventive strategy that
justified widespread surveillance. The FBI sought out friendly vice
squad officers who supplied arrest records on morals charges,
regardless of whether convictions had ensued.77

Federal government officials “were instructed not only to check police
records but to establish a ‘close working relationship’ with the vice
squad in their area and to be aware that in some jurisdictions acts of
sex perversion might only be prosecuted as ‘disorderly conduct.’”78 The
goal was to use arrest records to identify gay men.79
Adverse employment action based on arrest was not limited to
government jobs. Private employers, too, requested arrest records, and
those applicants whose arrests indicated homosexuality were not

73. Johnson, Homosexual Citizens, supra note 72, at 45.
74. See BEEMYN, supra note 25, at 129 (discussing the entrapment, interrogation, and
dismissal of Bill Youngblood, “a technician for the Department of Defense on their guided missile
and atomic bomb programs”).
75. See Johnson, Homosexual Citizens, supra note 72, at 47 (explaining that after
investigators accused a worker of being gay, “the civil servant was usually granted ‘the
opportunity’ to resign quietly”).
76. See Jon J. Gallo et al., The Consenting Adult Homosexual and the Law: An Empirical
Study of Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles County, 13 UCLA L. REV. 643, 688–725
(1966); Lewis, Lifting the Ban, supra note 19, at 389.
77. D’EMILIO, supra note 36, at 46.
78. JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 72–73.
79. Although LGB individuals of any gender could fall victim to the gay perjury trap, law
enforcement officials targeted men.
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hired.80 Some New York employers hired private agencies to
investigate job applicants for any signs of homosexuality in either their
daily habits or their arrest and draft records.81 More generally, in an
early 1970s survey, a quarter of over one thousand gay men nationwide
responded that they had been arrested on charges related to
homosexuality, and more than 15 percent reported that they had lost a
job when employers learned of their homosexuality.82
In sum, gay job applicants rationally sought to conceal any prior
arrests that would expose their sexual orientation. But such
concealment, if successful, could entail negative consequences down
the line.
3. Association Memberships. Some employers also sought
circumstantial evidence of sexual orientation by asking about
applicants’ memberships in private associations. Given the
discrimination faced by gay Americans, many nascent gay rights
organizations maintained strict confidentiality among members,
including the use of code names so that even group members did not
know the actual identities of their fellow members.83 As the stigma
against gay people began to dissipate in some cities and regions,
members became more open with each other, though still closeted to
the outside world.
The FBI attempted to infiltrate early gay rights groups in order to
identify members and to monitor their activities.84 The Mattachine
80. See WEINBERG & WILLIAMS, supra note 62, at 280 (“In the United States, for example,
if one has ever been arrested for a homosexual offense, whether convicted or not, he may find his
employment opportunities limited. Many employers, both public and private, ask whether a job
applicant has ever been arrested.”).
81. TOBY MAROTTA, THE POLITICS OF HOMOSEXUALITY 197 (1981).
82. WEINBERG & WILLIAMS, supra note 62, at 108–09. Five percent reported more than one
job termination because employers discovered their sexual orientation. Id. at 109.
83. See JOANNE MYERS, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF THE LESBIAN AND GAY
LIBERATION MOVEMENTS 8 (2013) (noting that while the two founders of the lesbian
organization Daughters of Bilitis did not use aliases, “the names of the others remain[ed]
confidential,” and that, in early gay organizations, “members usually adopted code names because
of fear of harassment”); STUART TIMMONS, THE TROUBLE WITH HARRY HAY: FOUNDER OF
THE MODERN GAY MOVEMENT 141–51 (1990) (recounting that the Mattachine Society “was to
be composed of members ‘anonymous to the community at large, and to each other if they so
choose’”).
84. Cf. Lewis, Lifting the Ban, supra note 19, at 390 (“FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover played
a leading role in justifying the crackdown and pursued homophile and gay liberation organizations
for decades (perhaps in response to a fear that a small homophile magazine, One, would ‘out’ him
as a homosexual).” (citation omitted)).
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Society of Washington, an early gay rights group, used code names for
its members in order to reduce the risk of FBI infiltrators determining
members’ true identities, as well as to prevent members from being
pressured into exposing their co-members in exchange for leniency
when threatened by the FBI or a government employer.85 The FBI
sometimes asked government employees whether they belonged to
Mattachine.86 Some gay government employees were afraid of lying to
the FBI and admitted their membership in Mattachine.87 But during
the 1960s, listing a gay rights organization on one’s job application
would render that person ineligible for government employment.88
These organizations provided an opportunity for employers to
make inquiries about applicants’ proclivities. By requiring job
applicants to disclose all current and prior organization memberships,
employers asked indirectly about sexual orientation. A gay person who
had ever belonged to a gay-related organization faced a dilemma. If a
gay applicant answered honestly about membership in a gay rights
organization, an employer would construe this as an admission of
homosexuality, and no job offer would issue.89 Alternatively, if one
failed to disclose prior or current memberships, the gay perjury trap
had been set.
B. Springing the Gay Perjury Trap: Punishing the Lie
When asked about sexual orientation, many gay job applicants tell
untruths in order to avoid being denied a job. This concealment,
however, allows employers who subsequently fire a gay employee to
claim that they terminated the employee because she lied about her
sexual orientation. This represents a gay perjury trap—the pretextual
assertion by the employer that the issue is not the employee’s sexual
orientation, but her mendacity. This shifts focus from the employer’s
85. Cf. CERVINI, supra note 64, at 90 (noting that Mattachine members were “very careful
about divulging their true names and consequently they usually use codes names at the meetings
and when they receive mail from the Society”).
86. Id. at 90–91.
87. See id. at 91.
88. See BEEMYN, supra note 25, at 189 (observing that Otto Ulrich was terminated from his
Department of Defense job when government investigators realized that he had listed his
membership in Mattachine).
89. See High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Off., 895 F.2d 563, 569 (9th Cir. 1990)
(“Plaintiff Weston, a homosexual, has a Secret clearance and in 1984 submitted an application for
Top Secret clearance as required for his job at Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. Lockheed never
forwarded his application to the DoD because his application revealed he belonged to a gay
organization.”).
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anti-gay policy to the individual gay employee’s “dishonesty.” This
section provides historic examples of the gay perjury trap in action,
with gay workers being punished for concealing their sexual
orientation, their memberships in gay organizations, and the details of
gay-related arrests.
1. Punished for Concealing Sexual Orientation. As discussed
above, public and private employers have long sought to rid their
workforces of gay personnel. Federal intelligence and law enforcement
agencies have been particularly aggressive in investigating their own
staffs in the hopes of punishing gay employees who evaded detection
during the hiring process. Thousands were harassed and terminated.
Very few ever fought back. Frank Buttino did. An FBI special agent
for decades, Buttino performed undercover work, including
investigating espionage and terrorism.90 During his tenure, he received
four special commendations, among other honors.91
Buttino’s unblemished career with the agency came to a halt in the
1990s after the FBI’s San Diego office received an anonymous tip
accusing Buttino of being gay.92 The FBI began an investigation of its
own agent, focusing largely on one piece of evidence: a love letter
written from one man to another.93 The FBI set the gay perjury trap by
handing Buttino a form that stated in part: “This inquiry pertains to an
anonymous allegation of homosexual activity.”94 The document said
Buttino “had to answer all questions fully and truthfully or face
possible dismissal.”95 When asked by FBI investigators, Buttino denied
that he had authored a romantic letter to another man.96 Five weeks
later, however, Buttino corrected himself and acknowledged having
written the letter in question.97 But it was too late. The FBI asserted
that because Buttino had been “deceptive” during their investigation,

90.
91.
92.

Buttino v. FBI, 801 F. Supp. 298, 300 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
Id.
John D. Cramer, Ex-FBI Agent, Fired for Being Gay, Fights To Get Back Job, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 30, 1990, at 1.
93. BUTTINO, supra note 17, at 94–95.
94. Id. at 95.
95. Id.
96. See Buttino, 801 F. Supp. at 300.
97. Id. Buttino explained that he had initially denied being gay because he feared admitting
his homosexuality would result in his termination. Id.
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he would lose his Top Secret security clearance and consequently, his
job.98
Unlike the many gay FBI agents who had been terminated or
forced to resign, Buttino defended himself, bringing a lawsuit
challenging the FBI’s discriminatory policy.99 The FBI defended its
action by arguing that Buttino was not terminated for being gay but for
being deceptive about being gay.100 The FBI argued that there could be
no constitutional infirmity in its firing of Buttino because Buttino had
been deceptive in affirmatively concealing his homosexuality.101
The FBI was being disingenuous, however, when it claimed that it
was terminating Buttino for his mendacity. Under the FBI’s policy at
the time, if Buttino had been truthful at the outset, the FBI would have
fired him.102 In these circumstances, it would be irrational for any gay
FBI agent to acknowledge his or her sexual orientation to FBI officials.
The FBI’s alleged reliance on Buttino’s deception was mere
pretext. The FBI’s unhealthy obsession with homosexuality was
illustrated by its blanket policy against gay agents and its treatment of
suspected violators. Agents suspected of homosexuality—but with
otherwise sterling records—were investigated mercilessly and
drummed out of the agency.103 Although the FBI enforced its anti-gay
policy for decades, Buttino was the first agent to fight back.104
The district court in Buttino’s lawsuit noted that one special agent,
a heterosexual individual who had worked for the FBI for twenty-six
years, had stated “unequivocally that the FBI did, during my years as a
Special Agent, have a policy of discriminating against gays, or what we
in the FBI often referred to as homosexual deviates, queers, fags,
faggots, fruits, punks and limp wrists.”105 The FBI’s 1990 internal

98. Id. at 300, 309 n.2 (“Because all FBI employees must have a Top Secret security
clearance, plaintiff’s employment was, by necessity, terminated after his security clearance was
revoked.”).
99. See id. at 298–300.
100. Irvin Molotsky, Gay Workers Gain Bias Rule at F.B.I., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1993, at A29
(“The bureau has responded that the agent, Frank Buttino, was dismissed because he gave
deceptive answers when he was first asked if he was homosexual, not because he was gay.”).
101. See Buttino, 801 F. Supp. at 300–01.
102. See CHARLES, supra note 35, at xv.
103. See Buttino, 801 F. Supp. at 304–05.
104. Cramer, supra note 92.
105. Buttino, 801 F. Supp. at 310 n.5.
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employment policy mirrored its external investigative policies of the
1960s: search and destroy.
Furthermore, the FBI generally treated suspected gay agents far
differently—and worse—than it treated heterosexual agents suspected
of sexual indiscretions. The questions addressed to gay employees were
far more intrusive and invasive than those asked of straight agents.106
Agents accused of homosexual activity were asked about “specific
private sexual acts” and their “childhood sexuality.”107 The questions
could be quite graphic. For example, the FBI investigators pressed
Buttino with statements like “We need to know the kind of sex you
engage in with other men.”108 The penalties exacted, too, were
disproportionately harsh, as
the FBI’s own documents . . . indicate[] that the measures taken
against Buttino (revocation of his security clearance and dismissal)
were more severe than the FBI otherwise takes in cases of similar—
or more serious—findings of “lack of candor” and improper
disclosure of information. Those documents suggest that the typical
punishment for indiscretions of roughly similar seriousness appears
to be censure, probation of six months to one year, and suspension
without pay for 7 to 60 days.109

The FBI did not terminate heterosexual agents who lied about their
sexual indiscretions.110 Given the so-called lack of candor resulted in
wildly harsher penalties based on the target’s presumed
homosexuality, the FBI was punishing sexual orientation—not
deception.111

106. Cf. Holbrook v. Reno, 196 F.3d 255, 258–59 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (documenting how the FBI
“repeatedly asked [a female agent] . . . whether she had had sexual relations with . . . [a male
agent]” but apparently not asking about specific details of the alleged encounters).
107. Id. at 305.
108. BUTTINO, supra note 17, at 115. The FBI’s obsession with specific acts mimics Florida’s
hunt for gay teachers during the Cold War. See Braukman, supra note 38, at 559 (“Investigators
scrutinized virtually every conceivable aspect of their targets’ sex lives, compelling them to
describe specific acts and the role played in each (most often articulated by questioners as
‘passive’ or ‘aggressive’) to measure their potential for corrupting Florida’s children.”); see also
id. at 568 (“Then came the coaxing and prodding to elicit intimate details about sexual activity
and exhaustive naming of specific acts performed with other women.”).
109. Buttino, 801 F. Supp. at 304 (citation omitted).
110. See BUTTINO, supra note 17, at 290.
111. See Buttino, 801 F. Supp. at 308 (“The court cannot help but wonder, moreover, whether
there is anything to indicate that Buttino’s lack of candor would ever have been an issue but for
the FBI’s history of anti-gay discrimination . . . .”).
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The Buttino v. FBI112 case illustrates fundamental aspects of the
gay perjury trap. The FBI questioned all job applicants about their
sexual orientation and steadfastly refused to hire anyone who
acknowledged being gay.113 Any gay agent who made it through the
initial screen worked in fear that the question would be asked again
because candor and lack of candor were punished equally—via
revocation of security clearance and termination from employment.
The district court recognized the catch-22 in which gay agents were
caught, and the judge “question[ed] . . . the rationality of a policy which
punishes gay employees for being less than candid about their
homosexuality when it is undisputed that . . . the FBI would clearly
have purged any employee for being candid about one’s
homosexuality.”114 In essence, the FBI forced the employee into this
“lack of candor” through its anti-gay policies and then subsequently
punished this same “lack of candor” that it had compelled.115
Ultimately, the Buttino court recognized that the FBI’s revocation of a
security clearance based on a lack of candor regarding sexuality was “a
mere pretext for the implementation of a discriminatory policy.”116 In
1993, Attorney General Janet Reno announced an end to the FBI’s
official policy against gay employees, though de facto discrimination
remains a problem.117

112. Buttino v. FBI, 801 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
113. See supra notes 102–105 and accompanying text.
114. Buttino, 801 F. Supp. at 308.
115. Id. at 312 (“[T]here is a viable question as to whether plaintiff’s ‘lack of candor’ and
‘uncooperativeness’ would ever have been an issue but for the FBI’s alleged anti-gay practices.”).
116. Id. at 301. The district court certified Buttino’s case as a class action against the FBI,
challenging the agency’s anti-gay policies as a whole. Buttino v. FBI, No. C–90—1639SBA, 1992
WL 12013803, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1992). The class action was rendered moot when the
Justice Department under Attorney General Janet Reno changed the FBI antidiscrimination
policy to include sexual orientation. Cf. Reno Orders FBI To Discard Anti-Homosexual Hiring
Policy, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1993, at A18 (“Reno has ordered the FBI to discard a policy making
it difficult for homosexuals to be hired, and the bureau now will forbid discrimination based on
sexual orientation. . . . Reno’s statement came as a federal class action case brought by former
FBI agent Frank Buttino, 48, began in San Francisco.”). Subsequently, Buttino settled his
individual lawsuit. Litigation Notes – Federal, LESBIAN/GAY L. NOTES (Lesbian & Gay L. Ass’n
of Greater N.Y., New York, N.Y.), Apr. 1994, http://www.qrd.org/qrd/usa/legal/lgln/1994/04.94
[https://perma.cc/2MV2-GW5D]. Under the settlement, Buttino received some damages, but not
reinstatement. See id. (“In exchange for dropping his request for reinstatement, Frank Buttino
will receive a cash settlement of about $100,000, $53,000 in legal fees, and a civil service pension
when he reaches age 62 in 2007.”).
117. See Molotsky, supra note 100.
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2. Punished for Concealing Membership in Gay Rights
Association. In addition to penalizing false denials of homosexuality,
some employers have sought to punish concealing indicia of
homosexuality, such as belonging to a gay rights organization. In 1972,
Joseph Acanfora III graduated from Penn State with the goal of being
a high school science teacher.118 His junior year had been momentous
for two reasons. First, Acanfora changed his major from meteorology
to education, so that he could pursue a profession in which he worked
with people.119 Second, he joined a student organization, Homophiles
of Penn State (“HOPS”), which sought to increase public
understanding of homosexuality.120 When Penn State refused to
recognize the group, its members—including Acanfora—brought a
successful lawsuit against the university.121
Because Acanfora had acknowledged his sexual orientation
during that litigation, state officials debated Acanfora’s suitability for
teacher certification.122 They ultimately forwarded his application for
certification to the Pennsylvania Secretary of Education without
recommendation.123 While the certification process proceeded out of
the public eye in Pennsylvania, Acanfora successfully applied for a
teaching position at a junior high school in Montgomery County,
Maryland.124 The school was satisfied with Acanfora’s classroom
performance as a science teacher, and Acanfora taught without
incident.125
After Acanfora had been teaching science at a junior high school
for several weeks, the Pennsylvania Secretary of Education held a press
conference and announced that Acanfora’s application for teacher
certification would be approved despite his homosexuality.126 Upon
118. See Acanfora v. Bd. of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843, 844–45 (D. Md. 1973), aff’d, 491 F.2d
498 (4th Cir. 1974).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 845.
121. See Acanfora, 491 F.2d at 500. Former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Thomas Clark sat on
the three-judge panel by designation. Id. at 499.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 500.
124. See id.
125. Acanfora, 359 F. Supp. at 845–46 (“The Board has in no way attacked Acanfora’s
classroom performance, nor has it charged Acanfora with bringing up the subject of
homosexuality in the school environment. The evidence is that he is competent and that he did
not discuss his private life while at school.”).
126. Id. at 845.
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learning that Acanfora was gay from the Pennsylvania official’s press
conference, which seemed designed to invite discrimination against
Acanfora, the Montgomery County Deputy Superintendent of Schools
transferred Acanfora out of the classroom and into administrative
work, where he would have no contact with students.127 The transfer to
a nonteaching position, even without a loss of salary, was “at heart, the
functional equivalent of an injury inflicted upon plaintiff’s reputation,
an implicit allegation that his homosexuality determines unfitness to
teach.”128
In response to this adverse job action, Acanfora granted several
journalists’ requests for interviews, including a segment on 60
Minutes.129 At a time in American history when homosexuality was still
equated with criminality and moral deviance, Acanfora attempted to
increase public understanding of homosexuality. Among his many
television, radio, and press interviews, Acanfora appeared with his
parents on a PBS program to discuss how gay people and their families
confront problems like discrimination and societal intolerance.130
Throughout his interviews, Acanfora “stressed that he had not, and
would not, discuss his sexuality with the students.”131
When Acanfora sued the Montgomery County Board of
Education to reinstate his teaching position, the school board argued
that it would neither reinstate Acanfora nor renew his contract because
his appearances in the media had sparked controversy.132 Reversing the
district court, the Fourth Circuit held that Acanfora had a First
Amendment right to speak to the media as he did because “a teacher’s
comments on public issues concerning schools that are neither
knowingly false nor made in reckless disregard of the truth afford no
ground for dismissal when they do not impair the teacher’s
performance of his duties or interfere with the operation of the
schools.”133 The Fourth Circuit noted that “[t]here is no evidence that

127. Acanfora, 491 F.2d at 500.
128. Acanfora, 359 F. Supp. at 857; see id. at 849–50 (“And it is no defense that the Board
merely transferred Acanfora, for the measurement of abridgment of constitutional rights is not
confined to dollars and cents. To rule otherwise would facilitate subtle circumvention of the law
so carefully developed by the highest court of this land.”).
129. Id. at 846.
130. Acanfora, 491 F.2d at 500.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)).
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the interviews disrupted the school, substantially impaired his capacity
as a teacher, or gave the school officials reasonable grounds to forecast
that these results would flow from what he said.”134 The court held that
the First Amendment protected Acanfora’s public statements and,
thus, the school board could not penalize Acanfora for his press
interviews.135
In anticipation of this holding, the school board advanced a second
argument: Acanfora’s deception. In its employment application, the
school board requested applicants to list their past and present
organizational affiliations.136 While Acanfora listed his student
membership in the Pennsylvania State Education Association, he did
not list HOPS.137 Acanfora refrained from disclosing his membership
in HOPS precisely because he believed that the school board would
discriminate against him.138 During the litigation, the school board
relied on Acanfora’s omission to justify its punishment even though it
was unaware that Acanfora had been a member of HOPS—and had
consciously decided not to mention it on his application—until after the
deputy superintendent had taken the adverse action against
Acanfora.139 Instead, according to a school board official, the decision
to remove Acanfora from the classroom was based on the fact that he
“was an advertised, activist homosexual.”140
By invoking Acanfora’s alleged deception, the school sought to
spring a gay perjury trap. The strategy worked. The Fourth Circuit held
that the school board could transfer Acanfora to a non-teaching
position because of Acanfora’s decision to conceal his sexual
orientation despite the board not knowing of Acanfora’s HOPS
omission when they decided to transfer him.141 The Fourth Circuit used

134. Id. at 500–01.
135. Id. (citations omitted).
136. Id. at 501.
137. Id.
138. See id. at 501 (“[H]e realized that this information would be significant, but he believed
disclosure would foreclose his opportunity to be considered for employment on an equal basis
with other applicants.”).
139. Id. at 503 n.4.
140. Id.
141. See id. at 503 (“It was Acanfora’s testimony that furnished the school system a factual
basis for the defense of misrepresentation. After Acanfora testified, the superintendent of schools
unequivocally assigned the conscious withholding of information as a reason for his unwillingness
to reassign Acanfora to a teaching position.”); see also id. (“We conclude, therefore, that the
school system should not be prejudiced because it did not include in the administrative file, as a
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Acanfora’s decision to conceal his sexual orientation as an excuse not
to reach the merits of Acanfora’s claim that the school district’s policy
was unconstitutional.142 The court reasoned:
Not every omission of information in an employment application will
preclude an employee from attacking the constitutionality of action
taken by the governing body that employs him. But here Acanfora
wrongfully certified that his application was accurate to the best of his
knowledge when he knew that it contained a significant omission. His
intentional withholding of facts about his affiliation with [HOPS] is
inextricably linked to his attack on the constitutionality of the school
system’s refusal to employ homosexuals as teachers. Acanfora
purposely misled the school officials so he could circumvent, not
challenge, what he considers to be their unconstitutional employment
practices. He cannot now invoke the process of the court to obtain a
ruling on an issue that he practiced deception to avoid.143

The Fourth Circuit in Acanfora v. Board of Education of
Montgomery County144 held that if a gay applicant conceals his
sexuality to be hired by an employer with a policy against hiring gay
people, then the applicant does not have standing to challenge the
employer’s anti-gay policy.145 This legitimized the gay perjury trap set
by the school board, which required applicants to sign—in the presence
of a notary, no less—the following statement: “I understand that
falsification of any information submitted on this application shall be
cause for dismissal from service.”146 One school official swore in an
affidavit:
This litigation by reason of plaintiff’s false application, is contrived in
every sense of the word. He ought not to bootstrap his way into a
constitutional issue out of such untruthfulness. Had he been truthful,
defendants would not have been involved in this litigation as they
would not have hired him in the first place.147

reason for denying Acanfora a teaching position, information about his motives that were known
to Acanfora but unknown to the school officials until he testified.”).
142. Id. at 499.
143. Id. at 503–04.
144. Acanfora v. Bd. of Educ., 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974).
145. Id. at 504 (quoting Kay v. United States, 303 U.S. 1, 6 (1938)).
146. Id. at 501 n.1.
147. Id. at 503 n.3.
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Shockingly, the school official scolded Acanfora for lying because, but
for the lie, the school district could have quietly exercised its anti-gay
policy and avoided litigation by not hiring Acanfora in the first place.
Acanfora ended up the victim of a gay perjury trap.148 If he had
told the truth, the school board—by its own admission—would have
discriminated against him based on his sexual orientation.149 But
because he omitted his membership in HOPS, he suffered the same
fate. Although the school’s anti-gay policy would now violate Title VII,
inquiry into memberships remains a method of setting the gay perjury
trap.
3. Punished for Not Elaborating on Arrest Record. Employers
have historically used accusations of deception regarding arrest records
to justify terminating gay employees. Although police departments
across the country arrested approximately one million gay men for
offenses related to their sexual orientation,150 Frank Kameny
represents one of the most famous cases. Kameny had been a
university professor before applying to work for the Army Map Service
in the late 1950s.151 On the job application’s request for arrest history,
Kameny responded he had been arrested in San Francisco for
“disorderly conduct,” but the charge had been dismissed.152 Kameny
was hired and started work as an astronomer just before the Soviet
Union’s launch of Sputnik started the space race.153
After only a few months, federal investigators approached
Kameny with the news that the Civil Service Commission had received
information indicating he was homosexual.154 When asked for details

148. See ROBERT WINTEMUTE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION, AND THE CANADIAN CHARTER 53
(1995) (“[T]he court upheld the transfer because he had failed to disclose his membership of a
gay student organization in his application for a teaching position, in order to circumvent the
school’s policy of refusing to employ gay teachers, which his ‘deception’ precluded him from
challenging!”); JOYCE MURDOCH & DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS
V. THE SUPREME COURT 179 (2001) (“Acanfora could not challenge the constitutionality of an
anti-gay employment policy because he had used ‘deception’ to try to avoid it . . . .”).
149. Acanfora, 491 F.2d at 501 (“The school officials admit that if Acanfora had revealed his
affiliation with the Homophiles they would not have employed him.”).
150. CERVINI, supra note 64.
151. See id. at 23–25.
152. MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 148, at 51–52.
153. Id.; see CERVINI, supra note 64, at 23–25.
154. MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 148, at 52.
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of his sex life, Kameny refused to answer, invoking his desire to keep
his private life private.155 Soon thereafter, the government fired
Kameny—not for being gay but for allegedly misrepresenting the
nature of his prior arrest in San Francisco.156 Although the arrest
documents only cited the penal code section without description, the
government accused Kameny of being arrested for “lewd and indecent
acts,” not “disorderly conduct,” as he had claimed on his application.157
Both were catch phrases used by police departments to arrest men for
suspected homosexuality.158 Yet, the government focused on the
difference in nomenclature to accuse Kameny of dishonesty and to
justify his termination on those grounds.159
Kameny’s situation constituted a version of the gay perjury trap.
If Kameny had been completely forthright in explaining that he had
been arrested on suspicion of homosexual conduct, the government
agency would never have hired him.160 Because Kameny acknowledged
his arrest but stated the charge neutrally, the government agency
accused him of duplicity and fired him on that basis. Kameny sued.161
The Kameny case represents the government’s time-tested strategy of
painting gay employees as blameworthy by attacking their alleged
deception—all the while diverting attention from the government’s
own exclusionary policy. Kameny lost his lawsuit but started a lifelong
quest to hold the government accountable.162

155. Id. Even after Frank Kameny had become the public face of the American gay rights
movement, well into the 1970s and beyond, he avoided discussing his 1956 arrest. CERVINI, supra
note 64, at 391.
156. See CERVINI, supra note 64, at 28.
157. MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 148, at 52; see CERVINI, supra note 64, at 28 (“Kameny
had not been arrested for disorderly conduct, but rather for loitering and ‘lewd, indecent, or
obscene’ conduct. According to the [Army Map Service], Kameny ‘failed to furnish a completely
truthful answer,’ and for that reason, it terminated him.”).
158. MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 148, at 52.
159. See CERVINI, supra note 64, at 28 (“The AMS’s official reason [for terminating Kameny]
appeared to have nothing to do with homosexuality. According to the AMS personnel officer,
Kameny had falsified an official government document.”).
160. See supra notes 18–35 and accompanying text.
161. Kameny v. Brucker, 282 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
162. After Kameny lost his legal challenge to the government’s policy, he became the most
prominent leader of the growing gay rights movement and its litigation strategy to get civil service
protections for gay workers. See PATRICIA A. CAIN, RAINBOW RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS
AND COURTS IN THE LESBIAN AND GAY CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 55–56 (2000).
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Federal officials used inquiries into arrest history as part of a gay
perjury trap. In his study of the federal government’s anti-gay
employment policies during the Cold War, Johnson explained:
Applications for federal employment contained questions about past
arrests and membership in subversive organizations that were
designed less to solicit information than to provide a clear basis for
firing those who lied about their pasts. If, for example, a gay male
employee was found to have been arrested on a sex charge in a known
gay cruising area but had failed to properly disclose it on his federal
application form, he could be terminated for the criminal offense of
falsifying a federal form. As Civil Service Commission general
counsel H. Patrick Swygert acknowledged, “These questions are
primarily used to impeach persons who falsely answered the
questions in the negative or to dissuade persons from applying who
believe their backgrounds might raise suspicions.”163

For gay men desiring federal employment, a previous arrest under
circumstances that indicated homosexuality could end one’s career
before it even began.
States sometimes employed a similar approach. At the close of the
1960s, the Florida bar disbarred attorney Ronald Kay following his
arrest for so-called homosexual solicitation.164 The bar association cited
both the “homosexual activity” and Kay’s “lack of candor” because he
tried to conceal the nature of his arrest from the bar, his family, and
associates.165 Kay’s reluctance to be open about his homosexuality is
hardly surprising given the loss of family, job, and status that gay men
suffered when their sexual orientation was revealed.
Failing to disclose an arrest that exposed one’s homosexuality
could lead to even harsher consequences than losing one’s government
job. For example, when FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover began
investigating Charles Thayer, a high-level employee in the State
Department, Hoover discovered evidence that Carmel Offie was also
gay.166 Offie worked for the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”)
Office of Policy Coordination.167 Hoover was working with Senator

163.
164.

JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 138.
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE
CLOSET 73–74 (1999).
165. Id.
166. CHARLES, supra note 35, at 99.
167. Id.
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McCarthy to coerce the State Department to fire Thayer, whom
Hoover considered a “degenerate” and a “high-class homosexual.”168
Hoover and McCarthy learned of Offie’s homosexuality because Offie
had been arrested on the morals charge of “hanging around the men’s
room in Lafayette Park.”169 Without mentioning Offie’s name,
McCarthy intimated on the Senate floor that there was a homosexual
within the CIA.170 Understanding McCarthy’s threat, the White House
demanded Offie’s immediate resignation on the “pretext . . . that, in
1948, when filling out his application to work at the CIA, Offie failed
to disclose his 1943 arrest in Lafayette Park.”171
But Offie’s termination did not satiate Hoover, who demanded
further investigations into Offie on the grounds he had gained his job
at the CIA “by concealing his past . . . in failing to disclose his 1943
arrest.”172 Hoover argued this constituted fraud.173 While the
Department of Justice declined to pursue criminal charges, FBI agents
continued to investigate Offie, following him “everywhere to ascertain
his ‘contacts and activities.’”174 Not content with physical surveillance,
“FBI officials authorized an illegal break-in of [Offie’s] Washington,
DC, home either to search his personal papers and belongings or to
surreptitiously install a microphone.”175 The FBI justified its pursuit of
Offie as necessary to facilitate his prosecution for failing to report his
1943 arrest on his employment application for the CIA.176
4. Summary. In general, it seems relatively noncontroversial to
fire someone for lying.177 Some employers exploit this fact by requiring
applicants to agree that if they have misrepresented or omitted any
information called for in the hiring process, they are subject to
“immediate discharge.”178 The employer then asks applicants if they
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 100.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 101.
176. See id. at 102.
177. See infra notes 314–40 and accompanying text.
178. The Head Start program in Dallas had such a requirement as well as suggesting that
“Homosexual Conduct” disqualifies an applicant from employment. See Head Start of Greater
Dallas, Inc. Application For Employment, HEAD START OF GREATER DALL.,
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are gay, refusing to hire honest gay people and later terminating any
“deceptive” gay people who were hired. This creates a bind that can
prevent gay people from working in their chosen field.
C. Preventing Escape from the Gay Perjury Trap
It might seem that job applicants could escape the gay perjury trap
simply by refusing to answer employers’ questions about sexual
orientation. By taking this approach, gay applicants neither
acknowledge their homosexuality nor lie about it. Historically,
however, this third path has not been a viable option for three related
reasons.
First, some employers have interpreted the refusal to answer
questions about sexual orientation as proof of homosexuality and have
rejected the applicant as they would any other gay applicant. When the
State Department’s Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs
investigated employees suspected of homosexuality during the Cold
War, officials could interrogate a government employee for hours; they
often hooked him up to a polygraph machine and treated any refusal
to answer explicit questions about sexual activity as an admission of
homosexuality.179 For example, when government investigators asked
about his private sexual activity, Frank Kameny declined to give the
details of his sex life, responding that “as a matter of principle one’s
private life is his own.”180 The government punished Kameny’s refusal
to answer intensely personal questions about his so-called “moral
conduct.”181 The Civil Service Commission had no actual evidence
against Kameny; it “simply interpreted his refusals to cooperate during
his . . . interrogations as admissions of guilt.”182
Second, employers have historically treated an applicant’s refusal
to answer questions about sexual orientation as itself disqualifying.
During the 1960s and 1970s, applicants who refused to answer
questions regarding homosexuality would not be hired, even if they had
https://web.archive.org/web/20081121194059/http://www.hsgd.org/PDF/HSGDEmploymentAppl
ication.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZJE7-CJPE] (last visited Oct. 23, 2009) (“I understand that if the
information I have provided is found to be false, misrepresented or omitted, it will be sufficient
cause to cancel the employment process as immediate discharge from HEAD START of Greater
Dallas, Inc. service when it is disclosed.”).
179. See JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 128.
180. CERVINI, supra note 64, at 27.
181. Id. at 41.
182. Id. at 42.
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been ranked as qualified following the federal civil service’s
competitive examinations.183 For example, the D.C. Circuit held that a
job applicant was properly “rated ineligible” for his “refusal to
comment or to furnish information as to whether or not [he had]
engaged in homosexual acts.”184 For public employees who had
somehow “attract[ed] public notice,” the D.C. Circuit explained, “the
Commission will ask, and presumably will disqualify, if either there is
a refusal to respond or an admission of a homosexual act.”185
More recently, under the FBI’s anti-gay policy, an applicant or
employee who refused to answer explicit questions about same-sex
sexual activity would be labeled “uncooperative”; this would serve as
the basis for termination, as happened in Frank Buttino’s case in the
1990s.186 The targets of the FBI’s anti-gay witch hunts understood this,
as “[e]mployees were told that failure to answer any questions put to
them during the inquiry could result in their being fired for failure to
cooperate.”187 Even in the late twentieth century, some courts held that
employers could demand that job applicants reveal their sexual
histories, including sexual orientation.188 These courts reasoned that a
job applicant’s refusal to answer questions about their sexual
orientation is sufficient grounds for terminating or refusing to hire an
employee.189

183. See Scott v. Macy, 349 F.2d 182, 182–83 (D.C. Cir. 1965); see also Richardson v.
Hampton, 345 F. Supp. 600, 603 (D.D.C. 1972) (reviewing the termination of a postal clerk for
“refus[ing] to admit or deny that he had engaged in homosexual conduct”); Baker v. Hampton,
No. 2525-71, 1973 WL 274, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 21, 1973) (stating that National Bureau of
Standards clerical workers were terminated because they “refused to answer inquiries about their
sexual preferences, practices and associations, claiming such questions were unrelated to job
performance and were, moreover, invasions of their right to privacy”).
184. Scott v. Macy, 402 F.2d 644, 645–46 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
185. Id. at 649. Scott later prevailed because the Commission had not provided him sufficient
notice of the policy under which he was being penalized. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 164, at 126.
186. See BUTTINO, supra note 17, at 175 (“Toward the end it accused me of not furnishing
the names and identities of those I associated with ‘in what appears to be a secret homosexual
society.’ The letter said I displayed ‘a lack of candor during the inquiry and a refusal to
cooperate.’”).
187. Id. at 286.
188. See WINTEMUTE, supra note 148, at 75 (“Refusing to answer the question would not
seem to be an option. Several courts have interpreted Hardwick as permitting public employers
or officials to ask, through questionnaires or polygraph tests, whether a person has engaged in
same-sex sexual activity.”).
189. See, e.g., Walls v. City of St. Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 193 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding no
violation of the constitutional right to privacy where a police officer is discharged after refusing
to answer employer questions about homosexual relations); Truesdale v. Univ. of N.C., 371 S.E.2d
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Relatedly, in many cases—at a time when government officials
automatically denied security clearances to gay people190—
interrogators considered any refusal to refute accusations of
homosexuality as sufficient to deny individuals any security clearance,
rendering them ineligible for employment.191 The government has
routinely asked citizens about their sexual orientation as a prerequisite
to obtaining a security clearance necessary to pursue one’s career.192
Third, in some cases, those individuals who refused to cooperate
with government inquiries into their sexual orientation were
threatened with public exposure. For example, when Florida state
officials began their search for lesbian teachers in the state during the
Cold War, some women refused to answer the most invasive of
questions.193 These teachers were told that failure to cooperate
candidly would result in a public hearing in which the target’s sexual
history would be announced for all to hear.194 This tactic made outright
refusals to reply quite rare.195
D. The Inherent Unfairness of the Gay Perjury Trap
For decades, millions of gay workers have lived and labored in
fear. Personal correspondence from the 1960s reveals that many gay
men worried about the dilemma they faced when seeking employment:
“be honest . . . about his homosexuality and almost certainly not be
hired,” or be dishonest and risk being fired when their employer
discovers the truth.196 Lesbian teachers similarly suffered a double
bind. A lesbian teacher “loses her job whether she admits her sexual

503, 509 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (same), overruled on other grounds by Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 413
S.E.2d 276 (N.C. 1992).
190. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1770 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“In 1964,
individuals who were known to be homosexual could not obtain security clearances, and any who
possessed clearances were likely to lose them if their orientation was discovered.”).
191. See BEEMYN, supra note 25, at 189; Marks v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 1373, 1375–76
(C.D. Cal. 1974).
192. See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Off., 895 F.2d 563, 580 (9th Cir.
1990).
193. Braukman, supra note 38, at 566–67.
194. Id. See generally POUCHER, supra note 37 (discussing Florida’s targeting of teachers
suspected of being gay or lesbian); STACY BRAUKMAN, COMMUNISTS AND PERVERTS UNDER
THE PALMS: THE JOHNS COMMITTEE IN FLORIDA, 1956-1965 (2012) (same).
195. Braukman, supra note 38, at 567.
196. CRAIG M. LOFTIN, MASKED VOICES: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS IN COLD WAR
AMERICA 1–2 (2012).
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orientation (fired because the bureaucracy fear parental reaction) or
denies the same (fired because she lied on a bureaucratic form).”197
Although the historic examples of the gay perjury trap skew towards
men, the mistreatment of lesbian teachers demonstrates that the trap
was not limited to gay men.198
Employers’ anti-gay policies forced LGB employees to lie and to
remain in the closet. In this way, the gay perjury trap reinforces the
presumption of an exclusively heterosexual workforce. As Professor
William N. Eskridge explains,
A major effect [of state interrogation] was to force or enable people
to self-identify, to take an affirmative position as to their sexual
orientation. Where the mask could be silence about one’s sexuality,
the newly pervasive state questioning precluded silence and put
homosexuals on the spot. They could affirmatively lie and commit to
a never-ending masquerade, where one lie led to another and often
to a life brimming with hypocrisy. Or they could tell the truth and face
ruin, including jail or an asylum.199

The gay perjury trap further prevents these individuals from living lives
of either open and proud proficiency or quiet competence. That is the
epitome of irrational discrimination. As Part II demonstrates,
Congress intended Title VII to remedy such invidious discrimination
in the workplace. But even after the Supreme Court’s decision in

197. ESKRIDGE, supra note 164, at 5.
198. The relatively higher number of male examples may be for one or more related reasons.
First, men were overrepresented in the workforce and in the published reports regarding anti-gay
employment discrimination. For example, the reported cases challenging the federal
government’s anti-gay policies were challenged by men who had been fired. See, e.g., Norton v.
Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (reviewing the discharge of a male budget analyst at
NASA for immoral conduct); Scott v. Macy, 349 F.2d 182, 183 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (reviewing the
disqualification of a male applicant for immoral conduct); Dew v. Halaby, 317 F.2d 582, 583 (D.C.
Cir. 1963) (reviewing the discharge of a male air traffic controller for past homosexual acts).
Second, many American leaders seemed more concerned with male homosexuality than female
homosexuality, as indicated by the fact that most vice squads were tasked with detecting and
arresting gay men, not lesbians. See Christopher R. Leslie, Standing in the Way of Equality: How
States Use Standing Doctrine To Insulate Sodomy Laws from Constitutional Attack, 2001 WIS. L.
REV. 29, 84 (2001) (“Many police departments employ undercover operations designed to entrap
gay men into offering or requesting oral sex.”). Regardless of the gender-skewed historical record,
the lessons of this Article are gender neutral. Unless courts and the EEOC interpret and apply
Title VII correctly, homophobic employers can use the gay perjury trap against both men and
women who conceal their sexual orientation.
199. ESKRIDGE, supra note 164, at 56.
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Bostock, the gay perjury trap may interfere with gay workers receiving
full protection from prejudiced employers.
II. THE RELEVANCE OF THE GAY PERJURY TRAP POST-BOSTOCK
Prior to the Supreme Court’s Bostock opinion, prejudiced
employers operating in one of the majority of states that failed to
protect against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation did not
have to muster a pretextual excuse for terminating—or refusing to
hire—LGB workers. They could legally verbalize their intent to
discriminate. And many did.
The Supreme Court’s Bostock decision should preclude private
employers from openly discriminating against gay employees. The
opinion decided three consolidated cases involving two gay employees
and one transgender employee who had been fired for their sexual
orientation and gender identity, respectively.200 In each case, the fired
employee challenged the termination as violating Title VII.201 Writing
for the majority, Justice Neil Gorsuch employed a textualist approach
to hold that Title VII’s prohibition on employment discrimination
“because of” an individual’s sex barred an employer from firing
employees based on sexual orientation and gender identity.202
By bringing sexual orientation discrimination within the ambit of
Title VII, Bostock forces homophobia into the closet. Now,
homophobic employers will articulate alternative reasons for refusing
to hire a gay job applicant or for firing a gay employee. In jurisdictions
where nondiscrimination protections covered sexual orientation,
employers have historically invoked a litany of pretextual justifications
for terminating gay employees, from “economic reasons”203 to vague
references about wanting “to go in a ‘new direction.’”204 To justify their
firing, businesses have falsely accused gay employees of misuse of

200. See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737–38 (2020).
201. Id. at 1738.
202. See id. at 1741.
203. E.g., Portugues Santa v. B. Fernandez & Hnos., Inc., 438 F. Supp. 2d 33, 34 (D.P.R.
2006).
204. E.g., Badanish v. Lake Cnty. Gov’t, No. 2:18-CV-351-TLS-APR, 2020 WL 2572516, at
*1 (N.D. Ind. May 20, 2020).
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company resources,205 sexual harassment,206 or other alleged
misconduct.207
Many of the pretextual arguments invoked by employers are
premised on factual disputes, such as whether the fired employee was
insubordinate or had violated a company policy. But one pretextual
argument had a more solid factual foundation: it is often undisputed
that an employee has concealed their sexual orientation. If an
employee’s attempt to pass as heterosexual provides legal grounds for
termination, then post-Bostock, prejudiced employers could attempt to
resurrect the same pretextual argument used against, among many
others, teacher Joseph Acanfora, FBI agent Frank Buttino, and
government astronomer Frank Kameny.
Given that the examples discussed in Part I are largely historical
(though all part of the modern gay rights movement in America), the
gay perjury trap may appear to have gone dormant. Furthermore, in
light of Bostock, it might seem unnecessary to revisit the anti-gay
employment discrimination of the past. This conjecture, however,
assumes a level of compliance chronically absent in the context of other
antidiscrimination laws.
Some might think that the gay perjury trap is no longer relevant
because most employment in the United States is at-will, which
generally means that employers can terminate workers without
reason.208 Although the examples presented involve government jobs
205. See, e.g., Rabe v. United Air Lines, Inc., 636 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2011) (reviewing a
lesbian flight attendant’s firing after she was falsely accused of “misusing company-issued travel
vouchers”).
206. See, e.g., Ceslik v. Miller Ford, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 2d 433, 439 (D. Conn. 2008) (discussing
false claims made that a gay male employee sexually harassed female co-workers); see also Garvey
v. GMR Mktg., No. 5:16-CV-1072, 2016 WL 11477427, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2016) (“[P]laintiff
contends that defendant GMR Marketing terminated his employment based on false accusations
that he offered sexual favors to customers, and that those accusations were pretext for
discriminating against him based on his sexual orientation.”).
207. See, e.g., Miguel v. Guess, 51 P.3d 89, 98 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (discussing a lesbian
employee terminated for allegedly “copying and sharing patient records and for being a disruptive
employee”); Doe v. Casino, 381 F. Supp. 3d 425, 427–28 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (discussing a terminated
casino card dealer, “claim[ing] that ‘[her employer] used a negative interaction with a customer
as a pretext to terminate [her] employment, and the real reason . . . was [her] sexual orientation
(lesbian)’”); Berghorn v. Xerox Corp., No. 3:17-CV-01345-S, 2018 WL 3242276, at *1 (N.D. Tex.
July 3, 2018) (discussing a gay employee who claimed that a firm used his alleged use of a
corporate credit card for personal expenses as a pretext for terminating him because of his sexual
orientation).
208. See Davis v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 804 F.3d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 2015) (“As most
employees work ‘at will,’ most aspects of their conditions of employment are within the
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with civil service protections, the gay perjury trap problem also affects
at-will employees who lack general job protections. These employees
are protected by Title VII and other antidiscrimination laws, and thus
cannot be fired for an illegal reason, which after Bostock includes
sexual orientation and gender identity. Employers can more easily
conceal their illegal discrimination if they exercise it during the hiring
process. If there are twenty-four candidates for an advertised position,
twenty-three of them will not get the job. One of the twenty-three
might be gay and might not have gotten the job because of the
employer’s illegal anti-gay discrimination, but it may be difficult for the
applicant to know and to prove that she did not get the job for a reason
different than the other twenty-two disappointed applicants. In
contrast, when an employer fires a current employee, that person alone
is generally singled out for adverse treatment.209 That singled-out
employee is more likely to investigate and pursue litigation if evidence
exists that the firing violated Title VII. Consequently, even private
employers with an at-will labor force will prefer to exercise their
unlawful prejudice during the hiring process instead of during
retention decisions.
This Part explains why gay employees cannot take complete solace
in the dormancy of the gay perjury trap. If history is any guide,
prejudiced employers will evade, thwart, or ignore laws designed to
defend workers from invidious discrimination. Post-Bostock Title VII
will likely prove no different. Understanding the discriminatory tactics
of the past will help to better ensure genuine equality in the future.
A. The Perceived Dormancy of the Gay Perjury Trap
The gay perjury trap might seem an artifact of bygone times. But
the lack of recent, publicized cases provides cold comfort; most antigay discrimination goes unreported because most victims of the trap do
not fight back.210 For example, before changing its anti-gay policy, the

employer’s discretion.”); see also Bucci v. Hurd Buick Pontiac GMC Truck, LLC, 85 A.3d 1160,
1186 (R.I. 2014) (Goldberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“As most employees
are at-will, the consideration of an employee’s at-will status as a factor weighing against
discrimination would render the statute meaningless.”).
209. In the context of mass firings—for example, during economic downturns—when many
employees are fired, it may be harder to identify discrimination absent obvious patterns or
common characteristics among the group of terminated employees.
210. Amici Curiae Brief of Scholars Who Study the LGB Population in Support of the
Employees at 19, Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (Nos. 17-1618 & 17-1623), 2019
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FBI threatened gay agents to “‘resign quietly’ or risk being fired,” and
the agents before Frank Buttino succumbed to the threat.211 Buttino’s
decision to fight back is the primary reason that we have any insight at
all into how the FBI treated its gay agents. During his legal battle with
the agency, Buttino wondered whether it would have been better to
have resigned, as all the other outed gay agents before him had done.212
Resignation—not litigation—is the most common response for
several reasons. First, the graphic questions asked by many employers
were designed to intimidate and exhaust gay people by “subject[ing
them] to surveillances, polygraphs, and interrogations regarding the
most intimate details of their sex lives.”213 Those gay FBI agents who
resigned under fire stated they had wanted to remain at the agency, but
the FBI threatened to reinterview friends, family, and neighbors to ask
about the employees’ homosexual conduct.214 Such threats made quiet
resignation the only palatable option for every gay agent who preceded
Buttino.
Second, those who refused to resign quickly were sometimes
threatened with prosecution for perjury. This is a literal embodiment
of the gay perjury trap. Some employers actually ask applicants about

WL 3003461, at *19 (“[C]ountless other acts of employment discrimination across the country go
unreported given the stigma, embarrassment, and perception that there is no adequate remedy
on the part of LGB employees.”); see Johnson, Homosexual Citizens, supra note 72, at 54 (“Most
did remain silent. In the early 1950s, no fired gay or lesbian employee stepped forward to
challenge his or her dismissal, as publicity would only have compounded the problem.”).
211. As Judge Armstrong described in Buttino v. FBI,
The declarations evidence the FBI’s extensive inquiries into its gay employees’ private
sexual activities—including detailed inquiries into specific private sexual acts and the
exploration of childhood sexuality. The declarations describe the FBI investigators’
attempts to obtain the names of other gay employees in the FBI. The declarations
describe the FBI’s threats that gay employees “resign quietly” or risk being fired. And,
significantly, at least one of the declarations asserts that the FBI investigators made
allegations of “lack of candor” by “twisting” the gay employee’s words “at every turn.”
801 F. Supp. 298, 305 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
212. BUTTINO, supra note 17, at 257 (“I wondered, too, if I should have resigned when all
this began. Not only were the costs mounting, but I also wanted to get on with my life.”); see also
id. at 284 (“The files showed that most resigned ‘for personal reasons.’”).
213. Id. at 284; see id. at 145 (“‘It sounds like they’re trying to wear you down so you’ll quit,’
he said. ‘That they’ll continue to harass you like this until you eventually resign.’”).
214. Id. at 286 (“The investigation . . . would include interviews with the employees’ parents,
family, friends, neighbors, and co-workers. The interview would focus on the employee’s
homosexual conduct. . . . It was the bureau that threatened to expose its employees’
homosexuality if they wouldn’t resign.”); id. at 272 (discussing one lesbian FBI agent who “had
acknowledged her sexual orientation to OPR investigators, and the bureau threatened to
reinterview her neighbors and friends if she refused to resign”).
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sexual orientation under oath. For example, FBI investigators
implicitly threatened Buttino with criminal prosecution for lying under
oath about sexual orientation.215
Third, gay individuals who fight discrimination in court often
transform into public figures, becoming targets of vitriol, hate, and
further discrimination. For example, Joseph Acanfora’s participation
in HOPS’ successful lawsuit to be recognized as a valid student group—
coupled with his efforts to secure his Pennsylvania teaching
credential—exposed him and caused him to lose his teaching job in
Maryland.216 Acanfora’s endeavors to protect his legal rights ultimately
cost him his livelihood. Similarly, when Miriam Ben-Shalom
challenged the military’s anti-gay policy through the late 1970s until
1990, she became a hero of the gay rights movement.217 But “[e]very
time a court ruled in her case, she’d had to cope with the negative side
effects of publicity, including being denied an apartment, being fired
from a civilian job and receiving anonymous death threats.”218 In
certifying a class action to challenge the FBI’s anti-gay policy, the
district court in Buttino observed that “many individual claimants
would have difficulty filing individual lawsuits out of fear of retaliation,
exposure, and/or prejudice, such that it is unlikely that individual class
members would institute separate suits.”219 In short, given this
dynamic, it is not surprising that most people faced with dismissal for
lying about their sexual orientation quietly resign and seek other
employment, leaving it impossible to quantify the number of
employees (let alone applicants) caught in the gay perjury trap.
Ultimately, many current victims of anti-gay employment
discrimination may remain silent because they perceive a lack of legal
remedies. This provides another important reason for courts and the
EEOC to ensure that Title VII is interpreted and enforced in a manner

215. See id. at 110 (“Fowler said that this was an official administrative inquiry and that there
was a potential criminal problem if I had lied under oath in the statement I had signed for Hughes
on October 31.”).
216. See supra notes 120–127 and accompanying text.
217. Julia Diana Robertson, Miriam Ben-Shalom: The Woman Who Fought ‘Don’t Ask Don’t
Tell’, HUFFPOST (last updated July 5, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/miriam-benshalomthe-jewish-woman-that-started-the_b_5952ca6be4b0f078efd985a8 [https://perma.cc/J8VQC6F5].
218. MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 148, at 393.
219. Buttino v. FBI, No. C–90—1639SBA, 1992 WL 12013803, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25,
1992).
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that conceives potential plaintiffs to step forward and document illegal
discrimination.
B. The Ongoing Threat
Although the case studies in Part I involved uses of the gay perjury
trap during the early era of the modern gay rights movement,
employers today continue to ask about job applicants’ and employees’
sexual orientation. Major companies—including such behemoths as
Facebook, AT&T, IBM, JPMorgan Chase, American Express, Wells
Fargo, and Deutsche Bank—collect data on their employees’ sexual
orientation.220 American Express has been doing so for over fifteen
years.221 However, many of these policies are relatively new; for
example, in 2016, JPMorgan Chase began “asking employees for the
first time . . . if they’d like to disclose their sexual orientation or gender
identity.”222 The Human Rights Campaign’s 2020 Corporate Equality
Index reported that 54 percent of firms invite their employees to
voluntarily disclose their sexual orientation anonymously.223 But many
inquiries are not anonymous. In addition to official policies collecting
information about employees’ sexual orientation, there are several
contemporary examples of managers and supervisors asking individual

220. Jeff Green, Your Boss Wants To Know If You’re Gay, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 8, 2016),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-08/straight-or-gay-your-boss-wants-to-knowbut-don-t-worry [https://perma.cc/7ZL4-TU5L].
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Self-Identification of LGBTQ Employees, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN FOUND.,
https://www.hrc.org/resources/self-identification-of-lgbt-employees [https://perma.cc/X97NUMKM].
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employees whether they are gay, including in retail environments,224
banks,225 and regional hospitals.226
Although some employers ask about sexual orientation to be
responsive and sensitive to the needs of their workforce, employees
continue to be terminated for lying about their homosexual
relationships.227 Furthermore, although the origin and historical
examples of the perjury trap lie in discrimination against gay men, a
version of the trap has recently been used against a transgender job
candidate. In Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Group, Inc.,228
an employer rescinded its job offer to a transgender woman.229 The
employer asserted that it was not discriminating based on the
applicant’s transgender status but because she had “lied during the
interview process, and that it was her failure to affirmatively reveal her
status as biologically male that led to the decision to rescind the job
offer.”230 The court did not embrace the employer’s
“misrepresentation” argument, but this was in part because the
employer did not actually ask the applicant “to reveal her sex, either
orally or on . . . application and hiring forms.”231 The court thus reached
the correct result, but it did so through reasoning that is easily
224. See, e.g., Sanderson v. Leg Apparel LLC, No. 1:19-cv-08423-GHW, 2020 WL 3100256,
at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2020) (discussing an apparel company supervisor repeatedly asking
their male employee whether a client was their boyfriend); Troutman v. Hydro Extrusion USA,
LLC, 388 F. Supp. 3d 400, 401 (M.D. Pa. 2019) (discussing a senior extruder getting asked if he
was gay shortly after beginning his position, and being subject to sexual harassment by his
coworkers and managers as a result); Helmer Friedman LLP, Helmer Friedman Files Suit Against
Trader Joe’s for Alleged Sexual Orientation Discrimination, CISION PR NEWSWIRE (Sept. 20,
2016, 2:27AM), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/helmer-friedman-files-suit-againsttrader-joes-for-alleged-sexual-orientation-discrimination-300331189.html
[https://perma.cc/FFV8-697T] (alleging that the grocery chain Trader Joe’s fired a store manager
due to their sexual orientation).
225. See, e.g., Slay v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. CA 10–408 ML, 2011 WL 1045629, at *1 (D.R.I.
Mar. 9, 2011) (discussing allegations that Bank of America’s new hire questionnaire included
questions about sexual orientation), adopting recommendations No. CA 10–408 ML, 2011 WL
938309 (D.R.I. Mar. 16, 2011).
226. See, e.g., Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1251 (11th Cir. 2017) (discussing
allegations that a hospital human resources manager asked the plaintiff about their sexuality).
227. See, e.g., City of Neodesha v. BP Corp. N. Am., 50 Kan. App. 2d 731, 774–75 (Ct. App.
2014) (“Lord Browne was terminated after the London newspapers reported that he had a
homosexual affair. Browne was reportedly terminated by the board for lying about the
relationship.”).
228. Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Grp., Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 653 (S.D. Tex.
2008).
229. Id. at 656.
230. Id. at 663.
231. Id.
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circumvented if the employer asks direct questions, as the government
historically did regarding sexual orientation.
The Lopez case illustrates two points. First, present-day
employers are using perjury traps to justify anti-LGBT discrimination.
Second, the lessons from the gay perjury trap should inform judges how
to respond to other types of discrimination, including against
transgender employees and job candidates.
The dearth of modern court opinions documenting the gay perjury
trap may reflect a self-selection issue. Those states that voluntarily
enacted antidiscrimination laws extending to sexual orientation are
relatively liberal states with relatively liberal employers. In contrast,
those states that successfully resisted such protections pre-Bostock are
relatively conservative, as are many of the business owners in those
states, which is why the employers in the Bostock cases felt
emboldened to openly terminate employees for their sexual
orientation. Those conservative states—the ones most affected by the
Bostock decision—are most likely to harbor employers who will deploy
the gay perjury trap to discriminate against gay workers, especially now
that open discrimination violates federal law.
In addition, in the post-Bostock era, employers may refashion the
gay perjury trap as an issue of religious liberty. Modern churches have
employed the classic trap to justify terminating employees who lied to
conceal their homosexuality. In Gunn v. Mariners Church, Inc.,232
church leaders justified firing their director by emphasizing that he
“had been asked 40 or 50 times if he were gay and had lied and said
that he was not.”233 But Bostock leaves room for more creative
maneuvers. Unfortunately, Gorsuch’s majority opinion in Bostock
signaled approval of anti-LGBT discrimination by employers claiming
that their religious beliefs include homophobia.234 If the Supreme
Court creates a broad religious exemption to Title VII’s protection of
LGBT employees, homophobic employers will likely wave the flag of
religion to justify their inquiries into sexual orientation and
mistreatment of gay employees and job candidates.235

232. Gunn v. Mariners Church, Inc., 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (Ct. App. 2008).
233. Id. at 3.
234. See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020).
235. Cf. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 573 U.S. 682, 690 (2014) (evaluating the defense
presented by the corporation invoking religious freedom to evade contraceptive mandate).
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C. The Need for Vigilance in the Post-Bostock Era
One can hope that the Bostock opinion will consign these uses of
the gay perjury trap to legal history books. But even with
nondiscrimination policies in place, the gay perjury trap remains an
ever-present threat in many occupations, such as law enforcement, “a
profession in which you may not necessarily be fired for being gay, but
you will absolutely be fired for lying.”236 Supervisors eager to fire gay
employees are willing to invoke the most convenient excuse for
termination. In many local police departments, “a homophobic police
chief or sheriff” would find it “much easier and accepted as proper and
ethical to fire a gay officer for lying than . . . for simply being gay.”237 In
many occupations and localities, gay workers will continue to worry
that their discretion could be penalized as dishonesty.
The Bostock opinion is a promising and welcome development on
the road to legal equality for LGBT Americans. Unfortunately,
however, the passage of antidiscrimination laws does not eliminate
discrimination. The enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not
eradicate racial discrimination. Despite the presence of Title VII,
gender discrimination persists. These laws, however, have not been
failures. They have reduced discrimination and have provided a means
of compensation for victims of illegal discrimination.
Bostock, too, will not end employment discrimination against
LGBT workers. The intense hatred directed against gay people in
America is too deep and fervent to be eliminated simply by a judicial
act of statutory interpretation. Although many employers who would
otherwise discriminate against gay workers will stop doing so to comply
with the law, others will attempt to skirt it.
To determine how anti-gay employers may attempt to circumvent
Title VII—or simply violate the law without being held accountable—
it is instructive to recall how employers in the pre-Bostock era
successfully flouted general job protections that sheltered gay
employees and job applicants from arbitrary discrimination. After
Bostock, Title VII prohibits an employer from firing workers based on
sexual orientation. Employers wishing to remove LGBT employees
from their workforce may look for another justification for terminating
these workers. In a post-Bostock workplace, employers may justify

236. GREG MIRAGLIA, AMERICAN HEROES COMING OUT FROM BEHIND THE BADGE:
STORIES FROM POLICE, FIRE, AND EMS PROFESSIONALS OUT ON THE JOB 173 (2010).
237. Id. at 173–74.
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firing a gay employee by claiming that the termination was based on
the employee’s prior dishonesty regarding their sexual orientation. If
future courts follow the Acanfora opinion’s reasoning, these employers
may be able to circumvent Title VII as applied to gay employees. Thus,
if employers can ask about sexual orientation during the application
process through direct and indirect questions, they can still set the trap.
If a gay job applicant acknowledges their sexual orientation during
the interview process, the employer may later politely inform the
applicant that the position was filled by someone else. The main
difference after Bostock is that the employer cannot announce its antigay policy. In the past, the FBI, police departments, and private
employers felt no shame in telling gay applicants to their faces: we
“do[] not hire second-class citizens.”238 After Bostock, such statements
invite liability. While abhorrent, the anti-gay policies of the preBostock era were at least often transparent. By driving discrimination
underground, Bostock may make it more difficult for gay applicants to
prove discrimination under Title VII.
If gay applicants successfully conceal their sexual orientation, they
may get the job. But they will work in fear, as Buttino, Acanfora,
Kameny, and others in the pre-Bostock era did. Because the law
generally permits employers to terminate employees for lying during
the application process,239 once the employee’s sexual orientation is
revealed, their job is potentially in jeopardy. The employer can claim
that it is not terminating the gay employee due to their sexual
orientation—now an illegal basis for termination—but rather because
of the employee’s fraud during the application process—a seemingly
legitimate reason for termination.
If courts allow employers to utilize the gay perjury trap postBostock, the Supreme Court victory will prove pyrrhic. Prejudiced
employers would be able to rid their workforces of openly gay
employees. Detected gay workers will be rejected or terminated.
Undetected gay employees will toil in quiet desperation, vulnerable
and fearful that any misrepresentation of their sexual orientation made
during their application process could result in their immediate
termination. Part III explores how courts should interpret Title VII to
prevent employers from circumventing Bostock through deployment
of a gay perjury trap.

238.
239.

BUTTINO, supra note 17, at 289.
See infra notes 332–33 and accompanying text.
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III. DISMANTLING THE GAY PERJURY TRAP
Bostock holds the promise of reducing discrimination against gay
workers if courts properly interpret Title VII moving forward. For
Bostock to be effective, courts must disable the gay perjury trap. Part I
explained how the trap has three components. First, the employer asks
about sexual orientation—directly or indirectly—and either refuses to
hire or fires gay workers who truthfully reveal their sexual orientation.
Second, if gay employees conceal their sexual orientation to get and
retain a job and their sexual orientation is later discovered, then they
are fired for their earlier dishonesty. Third, the employer declines to
hire applicants who attempt to evade the gay perjury trap by refusing
to answer questions about their sexual orientation. This Part argues
that courts should interpret Title VII in a manner that dismantles each
of these steps.
A. Prohibiting Employer Inquiries into Sexual Orientation
If an employer inquires about an employee’s sexual orientation
and, after learning that an employee is LGB, takes adverse action
against that employee, this alone should create a presumption of illegal
discrimination. Of course, the employer can rebut this presumption by
presenting evidence that the adverse job action had nothing to do with
the employee’s sexual orientation. This section explains why inquiries
into sexual orientation are sufficient—but not necessary—to create a
presumption of illegal discrimination.
1. Prohibitions on Employer Inquiries into Protected Categories.
Inquiries about a job applicant’s race, religion, sex, or national origin
are not generally considered to be per se violations of Title VII.240
Nevertheless, the EEOC cautions employers against asking these

240. See 1 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 12.04 (2021)
[hereinafter LARSON ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION] (“Traditionally, pre-employment
inquiries as to race, color, religion, sex, and national origin have been frowned upon under civil
rights laws. . . . It is important to understand, however, that inquiries per se are not among the
discriminatory employment actions explicitly banned by Title VII . . . .” (emphasis omitted)). But
see Snyder v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1131 (E.D. Mo. 2004) (mentioning that
the Eighth Circuit has considered questions about an applicant’s marriage and child plans to be
“a per se violation of Title VII”).

LESLIE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

48

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

9/16/2021 4:16 PM

[Vol. 71:1

questions.241 Such a query appears discriminatory.242 Questions about
an employee’s protected status are generally considered evidence in
discrimination cases because such inquiries are “suspected of laying the
groundwork for illegal discrimination.”243 An employer’s ignorance
about an applicant’s protected characteristics ultimately protects the
employer.244
Such inquiries are not per se illegal under federal law because the
questions can serve a legitimate function. For example, employers may
ask about race, religion, or gender to comply with EEOC
recordkeeping requirements or to implement a legal affirmative action
program.245 Also, inquiries into gender may be permitted when the
241. See Stephen F. Befort, Pre-Employment Screening and Investigation: Navigating
Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 365, 382 (1997) (“[T]he EEOC Guide
cautions against the use of questions that directly inquire about protected class status such [as]
date of birth, religion and national origin.”).
242. Collins Foods Int’l, Inc. v. INS, 948 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Pre-employment
questioning concerning the applicant’s national origin, race or citizenship exposes the employer
to charges of discrimination if he does not hire that applicant.”).
243. 1 LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT SCREENING § 9.02 (2020) (“[E]mployer inquiries are
relevant primarily as evidence that some other action, such as a refusal to hire, was undertaken
with discriminatory intent.”); U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, FACTS ABOUT
RACE/COLOR DISCRIMINATION (1997), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/fs-race.cfm
[https://perma.cc/W7V6-3F4P] (“[I]f members of minority groups are excluded from
employment, the request for such pre-employment information [regarding applicant’s race]
would likely constitute evidence of discrimination.”); see also Ian Byrnside, Note, Six Clicks of
Separation: The Legal Ramifications of Employers Using Social Networking Sites To Research
Applicants, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 445, 463 (2008) (“Although questions regarding [race,
color, religion and other statuses] are not necessarily illegal, employers generally avoid asking
them because they typically have ‘no legitimate, job-related reason for asking them, and they are
suggestive of unlawful discriminatory motives.’”).
244. See Naomi Schoenbaum, It’s Time That You Know: The Shortcomings of Ignorance as
Fairness in Employment Law and the Need for an “Information-Shifting” Model, 30 HARV. J.L.
& GENDER 99, 100 (2007) (“[E]mployment law utilizes ignorance as a means of achieving fairness
by blocking access to information that would otherwise enable employers to make discriminatory
hiring decisions.”).
245. To comply with federal regulations,
Each user should maintain and have available for inspection records or other
information which will disclose the impact which its tests and other selection
procedures have upon employment opportunities of persons by identifiable race, sex,
or ethnic group as set forth in paragraph B of this section, in order to determine
compliance with these guidelines.
29 C.F.R. § 1607.4 (2020); see also FREDERICK T. GOLDER & DAVID R. GOLDER, LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW: COMPLIANCE AND LITIGATION § 4:218 (3d ed. 2021) (“The EEOC
recognizes an exception for preemployment inquiries regarding race, color, religion, and national
origin when made for the purpose of complying with federal, state, or local equal employment
agencies.”); LARSON ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 240 (“The EEOC requires
extensive recordkeeping as to the race, color, religion, sex, and national origin of an employer’s
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question addresses a bona fide occupational qualification
(“BFOQ”).246
In addition to federal protections, state laws also condemn many
forms of employment discrimination. Some state laws restrict preemployment inquiries more than federal law does.247 Others explicitly
prohibit certain pre-employment inquiries into various protected
statuses, including sexual orientation.248 While other state statutes do
not prohibit such inquiries outright, their state commissions “advise
employers that it may be unlawful to inquire into these aspects of an
applicant.”249
Mirroring federal law, some states tether the legality of the inquiry
to the presence of a BFOQ.250 Sexual orientation, however, is not a

work force, including applicant data. Furthermore, the EEOC and the courts have endorsed
voluntary affirmative action on the part of private employers.” (footnotes omitted)).
246. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.7 (2020) (“Any pre-employment inquiry in connection with
prospective employment which expresses directly or indirectly any limitation, specification, or
discrimination as to sex shall be unlawful unless based upon a bona fide occupational
qualification.”). The EEOC advises,
Questions about an applicant’s sex, (unless it is a bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ) and is essential to a particular position or occupation), marital status,
pregnancy, medical history of pregnancy, future child bearing plans, number and/or
ages of children or dependents, provisions for child care, abortions, birth control,
ability to reproduce, and name or address of spouse or children are generally viewed
as non job-related and problematic under Title VII.
Pre-Employment Inquiries and Gender, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/practices/inquiries_gender.cfm [https://perma.cc/X9Y5-ENNS].
247. See Befort, supra note 241, at 386 (“The statutes of many states also limit preemployment inquiries relating to protected class status and some do so in a manner more
restrictive than federal law. . . . To the extent that these state laws provide the same or greater
protection against discrimination, they are not preempted by federal law.” (footnote omitted)).
248. Schoenbaum, supra note 244, at 103. For example, Maine’s Human Rights Act makes it
unlawful for an employer prior to employment to “[e]licit or attempt to elicit information directly
or indirectly pertaining to race or color, sex, sexual orientation, physical or mental disability,
religion, age, ancestry or national origin . . . .” ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4572 (2020).
249. Schoenbaum, supra note 244, at 103.
250. For example, Minnesota’s statute provides that pre-employment,
[e]xcept when based on a bona fide occupational qualification, it is an unfair
employment practice for an employer . . . to: (1) require or request the person to furnish
information that pertains to race, color, creed, religion, national origin, sex, marital
status, status with regard to public assistance, disability, sexual orientation, or age.
MINN. STAT. § 363A.08 (2020). Similarly, Pennsylvania law provides:
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice, unless based upon a bona fide
occupational qualification . . . [f]or any employer . . . to: (1) Elicit any information or
make or keep a record of or use any form of application or application blank containing
questions or entries concerning the race, color, religious creed, ancestry, age, sex,
national origin . . . .
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BFOQ for any occupation.251 For example, asserting customers may
not like gay people is not a BFOQ.252 Sexual orientation is not
indicative of analytical abilities, physical strength, or any other jobrelated quality.253 The inquiry into sexual orientation is therefore
inherently suspect and should be presumptively illegal.
Post-Bostock courts should condemn inquiries into sexual
orientation even though Title VII does not make it per se illegal to ask
applicants about their racial background (or other protected
characteristics). Inquiries about race are permitted to comply with
EEOC recordkeeping requirements or to implement a legal
affirmative action program. But neither rationale is relevant to sexual
orientation. Therefore, the justifications for allowing questions about
race do not apply to questions about sexual orientation. At a minimum,
EEOC guidance should be revised to state that inquiries regarding
sexual orientation are evidence of intent to discriminate. Alternatively,
the EEOC could follow state approaches and treat such inquiries as
per se Title VII violations.
2. Privacy Rights. Interpreting Title VII as precluding inquiries
into sexual orientation is consistent with protecting job applicants and
employees. Though the constitutional right to privacy is generally
thought of as a right of autonomy, it includes a right to nondisclosure
in some contexts. In Whalen v. Roe,254 the Supreme Court recognized a

43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 955 (West 2020); see also W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9 (2016)
(outlawing inquiries as to an applicant’s “race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex or
age” except when based upon a BFOQ).
251. See Kate B. Rhodes, Defending ENDA: The Ramifications of Omitting the BFOQ
Defense in the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 19 LAW & SEXUALITY 1, 7–8 (2010)
(“ENDA, as it was last introduced and passed, did not contain a BFOQ defense. . . . Without a
BFOQ, ENDA will never allow or entertain that someone’s sexual orientation may be a job
requirement or necessity.”).
252. See 804 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.01 (2020) (“A mere customer or coworker preference is
not a BFOQ, e.g., ‘customers prefer to deal with people of the same race’ or ‘employees are
uncomfortable working with people of different sexual orientation.’”); cf. Fernandez v. Wynn Oil
Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1274, 1276–77 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that the assertion that “Latin American
clients would react negatively to a woman vice president” is not a legitimate reason for
considering gender as a bona fide occupational qualification).
253. Some may argue that religious organizations have a BFOQ in discriminating against gay
employees. That issue is beyond the scope of this Article but warrants serious attention.
254. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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privacy right in nondisclosure of sensitive facts,255 while upholding a
New York statute that required doctors to provide copies of
prescriptions written for particular drugs to the state.256 Although the
Court deemed the right uninfringed on the facts before it, it
nonetheless held that a constitutional privacy right to nondisclosure
exists.257 Federal courts have embraced and expanded Whalen, holding
that the constitutional right to privacy encompasses the nondisclosure
of certain medical information,258 including prescription drug
records,259 psychiatric records,260 and AIDS status.261 Courts have also
extended Whalen beyond medical information to include financial
information.262
These privacy rights also extend to employees’ interests in
nondisclosure of personal information. For example, in Shuman v. City
of Philadelphia,263 the plaintiff’s employment with a police department
was conditioned on him answering questions about his alleged
participation in an extramarital heterosexual affair.264 The court held
that “a party’s private sexual activities are within the ‘zone of privacy’
protected from unwarranted government intrusion.”265 Consequently,
255. Id. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (“The Court recognizes that an
individual’s ‘interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters’ is an aspect of the right of
privacy . . . .”).
256. Id. at 593, 600 (majority opinion).
257. See State v. Skinner, 10 So. 3d 1212, 1216 (La. 2009) (noting that Whalen recognized that
the right to privacy includes “the individual’s interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters”);
see also E. Lauren Arnault, Status, Conduct, and Forced Disclosure: What Does Bowers v.
Hardwick Really Say?, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 757, 768 (2003) (“In Nixon v. Administrator of
General Services, decided just four months after Whalen, the Court acknowledged a
complimentary [sic] right to privacy with respect to dissemination of personal information.”).
258. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577–80 (3d Cir. 1980); see
also Arnault, supra note 257, at 769 (“Following Whalen, courts have continued to expand the
protection of personal medical records, solidifying a constitutional right to privacy of medical
records.”).
259. See Doe v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 72 F.3d 1133, 1138 (3d Cir. 1995).
260. See Haw. Psychiatric Soc’y v. Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. 1028, 1043 (D. Haw. 1979).
261. See Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 382 (D.N.J. 1990).
262. See Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1558–59 (2d Cir. 1983) (endorsing an
approach that weighs the individual’s privacy interest against the state’s interest in seeking the
disclosure of the individual’s financial information); see also Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and
Participation: Personal Information and Public Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L.
REV. 553, 560–61 (1995) (“A limitless sharing of information about such topics as one’s medical
history, sexual behavior, or financial affairs raises a threat to . . . self-determination.”).
263. Shuman v. City of Philadelphia, 470 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
264. Id. at 453.
265. Id. at 459.
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the court ruled that the police department’s policy of requiring
employees to answer all questions about their private sex lives “even
though the questions have no bearing upon an officer’s job
performance, is unconstitutional.”266 While Shuman involved public
employers, courts have extended the principle to private employers.267
The Massachusetts Supreme Court has explained that “in the area of
private employment there may be inquiries of a personal nature that
are unreasonably intrusive and no business of the employer and that
an employee may not be discharged with impunity for failure to answer
such requests.”268
This jurisprudence raises the issue of whether sexual orientation
is included within these nondisclosure rights. Initially, some federal
courts declined to protect information regarding sexual orientation.
For example, in Truesdale v. University of North Carolina,269 a North
Carolina court held that an employer could require job applicants and
employees to answer questions about “homosexual activity” and
“unusual or unnatural sex acts”270 because, under Bowers v.
Hardwick,271 “[t]here is no fundamental right to engage in homosexual
activity.”272 Similarly, in Walls v. City of Petersburg,273 the Fourth
Circuit held that a city could terminate an employee for refusing to
answer questions about her sexual orientation.274 The court reasoned
that “because the Bowers decision is controlling, we hold that [a
question asking an employee whether she has ‘ever had sexual
relations with a person of the same sex’] does not ask for information
that [the employee] has a right to keep private.”275
266. Id. at 461.
267. See Bratt v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 467 N.E.2d 126, 135 (Mass. 1984) (“In evaluating
whether the information sought from employees could amount to an unreasonable interference
with their right of privacy, we stated that the employer’s legitimate interest in determining the
employees’ effectiveness in their jobs should be balanced against the seriousness of the intrusion
on the employees’ privacy.”).
268. Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 431 N.E.2d 908, 912 n.9 (Mass. 1982).
269. Truesdale v. Univ. of N.C., 371 S.E.2d 503 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
270. Id. at 509.
271. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
272. Truesdale, 371 S.E.2d at 509 (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. 186).
273. Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1990).
274. Id. at 193; see Arnault, supra note 257, at 783 (criticizing Walls because “[d]ue to the
administrative nature of Walls’s job, the state interest was relatively low. Thus, Walls should have
received privacy protection in this instance.” (footnote omitted)).
275. Walls, 895 F.2d at 193; see also Condon v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 977, 988 (D.S.C. 1997)
(interpreting Walls to hold that “no privacy interest was involved with respect to whether the
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This line of cases is not controlling today. Even when Bowers was
good law, some courts held that Bowers was not decisive on the issue
of informational privacy. In Sterling v. Borough of Minersville,276 the
Third Circuit held that “sexual orientation [is] an intimate aspect of
[one’s] personality entitled to privacy protection under Whalen. The
Supreme Court, despite the Bowers decision, and our court have
clearly spoken that matters of personal intimacy are safeguarded
against unwarranted disclosure.”277 The Third Circuit has explained
that information regarding “one’s sexual orientation . . . is intrinsically
private”278 and falls into the protection of the right to informational
privacy.279
Most significantly, the legal landscape changed dramatically in
2003 when the Supreme Court decided Lawrence v. Texas.280 In
Lawrence, the Court explicitly overruled Bowers and recognized a
substantive privacy right for consenting adults to engage in same-sex
sexual activities.281 This suggests that cases like Shuman, which protect
heterosexual privacy,282 now also protect homosexual privacy. With
Bowers repudiated, the foundation of the Truesdale and Walls opinions
has been eliminated.283 After Lawrence, even the narrow reading of
Whalen advanced by Truesdale and Walls protects against coerced
disclosure of sexual orientation, because homosexual conduct is now
covered by the autonomy branch of the constitutional right of privacy.
The Bostock opinion strengthens the constitutional case against
allowing employer inquiries into sexual orientation. Before Bostock,
some courts held that when an employer could “lawfully have
discharged [an employee] on the basis of her sexual preference, when
allegations surface[] about [an employee’s] sexual preference [the

plaintiff had engaged in homosexual relations”), aff’d, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998), rev’d, 528 U.S.
141 (2000); Dawson v. State Law Enf’t Div., No. 3:91–1403–17, 1992 WL 208967, at *5 (D.S.C.
Apr. 6, 1992) (interpreting Shuman as “recogniz[ing] that some portions of a public official’s
private sexual life may be within the zone of protected privacy, but it in no way states that the
constitutional right of privacy extends to sexual conduct committed between two males”).
276. Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2000).
277. Id. at 196.
278. Id. at 196 n.4.
279. See id. at 194 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977)).
280. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
281. Id. at 578.
282. See supra notes 263–268 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 269–275 and accompanying text.
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employer has] a right to question her about it.”284 Consequently, this
reasoning goes, the employee’s privacy rights are not infringed.285
Similarly, older opinions held that government agencies could inquire
into a job applicant’s sexual orientation because it was legal to deny
security clearances to gay people.286 Now that it is no longer legal to
condition either employment or security clearances on heterosexuality,
the inquiry into an applicant’s sexual orientation serves no legal
purpose. By bringing sexual orientation discrimination within the
ambit of Title VII, Bostock reinforces the position that employers
violate job applicants' and employees’ constitutional rights to privacy
when interviewers pry into sexual orientation.
The right to not disclose personal information, however, is not
absolute.287 To determine whether collecting or disseminating
information violates the constitutional right to nondisclosure, courts
must balance “the state’s interests in disclosure . . . against the privacy
needs of the individual.”288 There may be legitimate reasons to inquire
into employees’ off-duty sexual relations. For example, a police
department, in its role as employer, may investigate an employee’s offduty sexual activities for various reasons, such as when there are claims
that an officer has committed sexual assault,289 is sleeping with a
mobster’s wife,290 or is in a relationship with a subordinate.291

284. Madsen v. Erwin, 481 N.E.2d 1160, 1172 (Mass. 1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
285. Id.
286. See Marks v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 1373, 1376–77 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
287. Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 196 (3d Cir. 2000).
288. Shuman v. City of Philadelphia, 470 F. Supp. 449, 458 (E.D. Pa. 1979). The Shuman court
explained,
In the area of privacy, the hesitation to compel disclosure may rest upon different
grounds. If there is a constitutionally protected “zone-of-privacy”, compelled
disclosure in and of itself may be an invasion of that zone, and therefore, a violation of
protected rights. Absent a strong countervailing state interest, disclosure of private
matters should not be compelled.
Id.
289. See State Trooper Fraternal Ass’n v. New Jersey, No. 08–3820, 2008 WL 4378343, at *6–
7 (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 2008) (explaining that the officer’s assertion that sexual conduct was
consensual does not make further inquiry into the incident an unconstitutional invasion of
privacy).
290. See Baron v. Meloni, 556 F. Supp. 796, 798–800 (W.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d, 779 F.2d 36 (2d
Cir. 1985).
291. See, e.g., Puzick v. City of Colorado Springs, 680 P.2d 1283, 1285 (Colo. App. 1983)
(upholding a male sergeant’s suspension for off-duty sexual relations with a probationary
policewoman); see also Cronin v. Town of Amesbury, 895 F. Supp. 375, 385 (D. Mass. 1995)
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Employers must have a legitimate reason to inquire into
applicants’ and employees’ sexual orientation. As the Third Circuit
noted in Sterling, “[i]f there is a government interest in disclosing or
uncovering one’s sexuality that is ‘genuine, legitimate and compelling,’
then this legitimate interest can override the protections of the right to
privacy.”292 The balance, however, weighs heavily against disclosure
because “[i]t is difficult to imagine a more private matter than one’s
sexuality and a less likely probability that the government would have
a legitimate interest in disclosure of sexual identity.”293
The Supreme Court’s Bostock decision makes the right-to-privacy
argument against coerced disclosure of sexual orientation even more
compelling because the balance in favor of privacy rights becomes
stronger as the employer’s interest in uncovering the private
information becomes less convincing. The employer must show a
legitimate need to know an applicant’s sexual orientation. Bostock
should make it harder for employers to argue that they have a
legitimate interest in discovering the sexual orientation of applicants
and employees, because a federal statute now provides that sexual
orientation cannot be the basis for employment decisions. Before
Bostock, courts held that an employee’s privacy rights trump an
employer’s desire to know about “off-duty personal activities” unless
they “have an impact upon his on-the-job performance.”294 Bostock is

(noting that the police chief’s “liberty interest in his private sexual activities and fantasies which
are constitutionally protected against unwarranted government intrusion and disclosure . . . must
be balanced against the town’s justifiable concerns about [his] effectiveness as a police chief, his
trustworthiness as custodian of prisoners, and his susceptibility to blackmail”), aff’d, 81 F.3d 257
(1st Cir. 1996).
292. Sterling, 232 F.3d at 196 (quoting Doe v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 72 F.3d 1133, 1141 (3d.
Cir. 1995)). As the Ninth Circuit explained,
The City must show that its inquiry into appellant’s sex life was justified by the
legitimate interests of the police department, that the inquiry was narrowly tailored to
meet those legitimate interests, and that the department’s use of the information it
obtained about appellant’s sexual history was proper in light of the state’s interests.
Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 469 (9th Cir. 1983).
293. Sterling, 232 F.3d at 196; cf. Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 192 (4th Cir. 1990)
(“The more intimate or personal the information, the more justified is the expectation that it will
not be subject to public scrutiny.”).
294. Shuman v. City of Philadelphia, 470 F. Supp. 449, 459 (E.D. Pa. 1979); see also State
Trooper Fraternal Ass’n, 2008 WL 4378343, at *6 (“[W]hen a police officer’s private sexual
conduct adversely affects job performance, a police department may investigate and regulate that
conduct.”); Sylvester v. Fogley, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1140 (W.D. Ark. 2005) (“In the absence of
a nexus between private activity and poor job performance, investigation into private affairs is
unconstitutional. Where an officer’s private life affects his job performance, a police agency may
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based on the premise that sexual orientation has no relationship to job
performance and therefore strengthens the argument that the
employer’s desire to know does not outweigh the employee’s privacy
right in nondisclosure.295

3. Indirect Questions. Employers intent on discriminating against
gay workers may attempt to circumvent any prohibition on direct
questions regarding sexual orientation by inquiring indirectly. As
explained in Part I, employers historically asked about arrest records
and organizational memberships.
The arrest records issue might appear superseded for two reasons:
First, states can no longer criminalize private, same-sex conduct.296
And, second, many states have enacted “ban-the-box” laws prohibiting
employers from asking job candidates about their criminal records in
initial job applications.297
Although these improvements represent progress, the underlying
problem remains. First, many gay job candidates have arrest records or
convictions for private, consensual sex in the pre-Lawrence era. These
people deserve protection from the gay perjury trap. Furthermore,
despite the Lawrence opinion’s invalidation of state sodomy laws,
many local police departments still conduct stings and mass arrests of
men suspected of being gay.298 These police raids are likely
unconstitutional, but they nonetheless create arrest records for the

inquire into that distinct, job-related portion of the officer’s private affairs.” (citations omitted)),
aff’d, 465 F.3d 851 (8th Cir. 2006).
295. See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1741 (2020) (“An individual’s
homosexuality or transgender status is not relevant to employment decisions.”).
296. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); Leslie, Perfect Storm, supra note 44, at
526–31 (explaining how the Lawrence Court’s substantive due process approach eliminated
sodomy laws in a way that an equal protection approach would not have).
297. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NO. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON
THE CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS
UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 n.101 (2012),
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/arrest_conviction.cfm [https://perma.cc/2T5L-SCCW]. Some
states have distinguished between arrests and convictions in their ban-the-box laws. See, e.g., King
v. Gen. Info. Servs., Inc., 903 F. Supp. 2d 303, 312–13 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (“In Pennsylvania,
employers are allowed to consider an applicant’s felony and misdemeanor convictions, but not
mere arrests, in connection with hiring decisions.”).
298. See, e.g., J. Kelly Strader & Lindsey Hay, Lewd Stings: Extending Lawrence v. Texas to
Discriminatory Enforcement, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 465, 465–66 (2019) (documenting the use of
a police sting against gay men in Palm Springs in 2010).
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innocent gay men who are targeted. Those records could prompt
employment discrimination if employers can inquire about arrests and
their circumstances.299
Second, ban-the-box laws do not solve the problem of arrest
records being used as part of a gay perjury trap. These laws are
necessary; empirical studies show that checking the box on an
employment application drastically reduces an applicant’s likelihood
of receiving a call back.300 Further, these effects are highly racialized,
with Black applicants in particular enduring discrimination.301
Unfortunately, however, many employers can continue to misuse
arrest records. First, although two-thirds of states have ban-the-box
laws, one-third do not.302 Also, some such laws apply to only a subset
of employers.303 Most importantly, these laws prohibit questions about
applicants’ criminal records on initial applications, but they allow these
inquiries later in the application process.304
Appreciating the history of the gay perjury trap can inform
ongoing legislative debates. The use of arrest records in the gay perjury

299. Furthermore, independent of homophobia, the mere fact of being arrested could render
an otherwise qualified gay applicant ineligible for employment, even though the arrest was for
constitutionally protected conduct. See Joni Hersch & Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Something To
Talk About: Information Exchange Under Employment Law, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 49, 88 (2016)
(“Advocates for . . . ban-the-box laws are concerned that employers will automatically throw out
applications that check the wrong box . . . without any further consideration.”).
300. See Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOCIO. 937, 958–59 (2003)
(“While the ratio of callbacks for nonoffenders relative to ex-offenders for whites is 2:1, this same
ratio for blacks is nearly 3:1.”).
301. Id. at 957–59; Kimani Paul-Emile, Beyond Title VII: Rethinking Race, Ex-Offender
Status, and Employment Discrimination in the Information Age, 100 VA. L. REV. 893, 951 (2014)
(“The unfettered access to arrest and conviction data currently enjoyed by employers perpetuates
bias, stigma, and discrimination against people with criminal records and widens racial
disparities.”).
302. See BETH AVERY & HAN LU, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, BAN THE BOX 2 (2020),
https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/Ban-the-Box-Fair-Chance-State-and-Local-GuideOct-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/RHJ6-P52Q] (“Nationwide, 36 states and over 150 cities and
counties have adopted what is widely known as ‘ban the box’ so that employers consider a job
candidate’s qualifications first—without the stigma of a conviction or arrest record.”).
303. Johnathan J. Smith, Banning the Box but Keeping the Discrimination?: Disparate Impact
and Employers’ Overreliance on Criminal Background Checks, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 197,
216 (2014) (“Moreover, even in locations where ban the box policies are in effect, for the most
part they cover only a subset of employers.”).
304. See Joseph Fishkin, The Anti-Bottleneck Principle in Employment Discrimination Law,
91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1429, 1459 (2014) (“[M]ost of the new ban the box measures merely prohibit
employers from asking about convictions on an initial application form, [but] . . . employers are
free to inquire at later stages.” (emphasis omitted)).
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trap provides yet another reason for those holdout state legislatures to
enact ban-the-box laws and for all states to ensure that their ban-thebox statutes are sufficiently broad to protect the civil rights of all
minorities.
Although it may seem harder to prevent employers from inquiring
about organizational memberships as a proxy for sexual orientation,
EEOC guidelines already discourage inquiries into organizations that
“indicate the applicant’s race, sex,” or other protected status.305 In a
similar spirit, the EEOC should permit job applicants to omit
references to clubs or organizations that would implicitly disclose the
applicants’ sexual orientation.
In addition to the inquiries discussed in Part I, the recent legal
recognition of same-sex marriages provides employers an additional
avenue for asking about sexual orientation. Family structures are
different now than when Frank Kameny and Joseph Acanfora were
fired from their jobs. Instead of asking about arrests and memberships,
curious interviewers today are more likely to ask seemingly innocent
questions about the applicant’s family life. An honest answer may
reveal the applicant’s sexual orientation.
Indeed, same-sex marriage has proved a double-edged sword for
some. In the wake of marriage equality, some employers use inquiries
into marriage and emergency contacts to uncover the sexual
orientation of applicants and employees.306 Before Bostock, in states
without LGBT-inclusive nondiscrimination laws, gay employees could
get married on a weekend and then be fired for their sexual orientation
upon returning to work on the following Monday.307 Bostock should
305. THOMSON REUTERS ED. STAFF, 1 CHECKLISTS FOR CORPORATE COUNSEL § 1:65 (Apr.
2021 ed. 2021) (“Inquiries about organizations, clubs, societies, and lodges of which an applicant
may be a member or any other questions, which may indicate the applicant’s race, sex, national
origin, disability status, age, religion, color or ancestry if answered, should generally be
avoided.”).
306. See, e.g., Barrett v. Fontbonne Acad., No. NOCV2014–751, 2015 WL 9682042, at *1
(Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 16, 2015) (evaluating the termination of a new employee after he listed his
husband as his emergency contact). While a firm can collect information about a same-sex spouse
on an insurance policy, the firm cannot misuse that information. An employer telling others that
an employee has listed a same-sex partner as an insurance beneficiary could constitute the tort of
invasion of privacy. See Greenwood v. Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, 663 N.E.2d 1030, 1035 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1995) (reversing dismissal of privacy tort in which lawyer sued his law firm employer
because “information about his male partner was shared ‘with persons who had no responsibility
for the administration of the benefit programs and no need to know the information’”).
307. See Nancy J. Knauer, The Politics of Eradication and the Future of LGBT Rights, 21
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 615, 617 n.12 (2020) (“Until Bostock, same-sex couples who exercised their
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put an end to employers punishing gay newlyweds. But a problem
remains: employers can ask job applicants about their marital status
during job interviews. Some federal opinions have treated questions
about marriage status and plans as a per se violation of Title VII when
followed by an adverse job action.308 The Bostock opinion provides
another reason to embrace this line of precedent.
B. Precluding Penalties for Employees Misrepresenting Their Sexual
Orientation
The gay perjury trap is premised on the notion that employees can
be fired for lying. This section reviews that premise and argues that
lying about sexual orientation in a post-Bostock work environment
should not be grounds for firing or other adverse employer actions.
Even if courts interpret Title VII to forbid inquiries into sexual
orientation—as they should—and even if employers have a policy of
not asking, many employers will still ask. Our national experience with
the military’s failed Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (“DADT”) policy proves
the point. Although DADT contained an explicit prohibition on
military officers asking about sexual orientation or investigating
rumors that a servicemember was gay, officers continued to ask, harass,
and discharge gay military members.309 Due to this type of rampant
noncompliance with the policy, it is not sufficient to merely prohibit
employers’ inquiry into sexual orientation. When illegally asked about
their sexual orientation, gay servicemembers generally lied to protect
their jobs.310 Many gay employees in the civilian sector are likely to
respond similarly.
constitutional right to marry could be fired the next day due to their sexual orientation in a
majority of states.”); Gene Robinson, State of LGBT Rights: Married on Sunday, but Fired on
Monday, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 14, 2017, 1:19 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/state-of-lgbtrights-married-on-sunday-but-fired-on-monday [https://perma.cc/RAP7-WHS3] (same); see also
Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 166 (2d Cir. 2018) (Lynch, J., dissenting) (“In its
amicus submission, the EEOC quite reasonably asks whether it is just that a gay employee can be
married on Sunday, and fired on Monday—discriminated against at his or her job for exercising
a right that is protected by the Constitution.”), aff’d sub nom. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S.
Ct. 1731 (2020).
308. See, e.g., Snyder v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1131 (E.D. Mo. 2004)
(“The Eighth Circuit has considered such questions [about marriage status and plans] a per se
violation of Title VII.”).
309. See NATHANIEL FRANK, UNFRIENDLY FIRE: HOW THE GAY BAN UNDERMINES THE
MILITARY AND WEAKENS AMERICA 167–99 (2009).
310. See Kim D. Chanbonpin, “It’s a K kou Thing”: The DADT Repeal and a New
Vocabulary of Anti-Subordination, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 905, 919 (2013) (“Because LGBTQ
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Misrepresenting one’s sexual orientation in this context should not
constitute a fireable offense because, as the Bostock Court recognized,
Title VII does not “care if other factors besides sex contribute to an
employer’s discharge decision.”311 Combining sexual orientation and
lying about sexual orientation does not change the calculus because the
terminated employee’s sexual orientation “need not be the sole or
primary cause of the employer’s adverse action.”312 As long as an
employer treats sexual orientation as a factor, Title VII is violated.
Although an employer may try to argue that the employee’s
misrepresentation is the sole ground for termination, courts should be
wary of such arguments, as the following sections explain.
1. Lying as a Fireable Offense. Employers may argue that even if
their inquiries into sexual orientation are illegal, an employee can still
be fired for lying. Courts routinely hold that employers may penalize
employees for having lied during the application process. This is one of
the lessons from Acanfora: dishonesty provides sufficient cause for
termination.313 In the past, when fired employees sued claiming
violations of Title VII on the basis of racial or gender discrimination,
courts rejected their claims where the employer could show that the
termination stemmed from the employee’s misrepresentation during
the application process or a subsequent internal inquiry.
For example, in Hargett v. New York City Transit Authority,314 a
terminated employee sued, alleging that he was being discriminated

service members feared separation from service, many of them were forced to lie or mislead their
colleagues, thereby actually undermining unit cohesion.”); Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp.
968, 979 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (“The policy of the Act is not only inherently deceptive. It also offers
powerful inducements to homosexuals to lie.”), vacated, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Log
Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884, 907 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (noting a gay
servicemember “testified that the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Act effectively made it impossible to
honor the ‘Integrity First’ value of the credo, because on occasion, he felt forced to lie rather than
violate the Act”), vacated, 658 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2011); Tobias Barrington Wolff, Compelled
Affirmations, Free Speech, and the U.S. Military’s Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Policy, 63 BROOK. L.
REV. 1141, 1153 (1997) (“The lies that gay and lesbian servicemembers are forced to tell about
themselves under the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy are, to say the least, a matter of active concern
for them.”).
311. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1748 (2020).
312. Id. at 1744.
313. See supra notes 119–148 and accompanying text.
314. Hargett v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 640 F. Supp. 2d 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d sub nom.
Hargett v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 381 F. App’x 12 (2d Cir. 2010).
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against based on his race.315 The employer, the New York City Transit
Authority (“NYCTA”), responded that the employee was fired
because on his employment application, he represented that he had
never been disciplined by an employer nor resigned while a disciplinary
action was pending against him.316 This was a lie.317 The employee
swore, under penalty of prosecution, he had left a previous position
because of a bank merger.318 This, too, was not true.319 The plaintiff
argued it was unfair for the NYCTA to investigate him because he had
already passed a background check and was an employee.320 The court
rejected this argument, characterizing the plaintiff’s argument as “since
the NYCTA Defendants failed to [discover] that he lied to them in
1998, they missed their chance.”321 The court reasoned “there is no such
rule. It was only good luck—and perhaps shoddy work by the human
resources department—that NYCTA did not discover that Hargett had
been twice fired, and was lying on his employment application.”322
Those lies constituted good cause for his termination, and the district
judge accordingly granted summary judgment to the employer.323
Courts have also rejected discrimination claims when employers
terminate an employee for falsely representing his or her educational
achievement. For example, in Gilty v. Village of Oak Park,324 Selester
Gilty applied to be a law enforcement officer in Oak Park, Illinois, and
represented that he had a bachelor’s degree and was pursuing his
master’s degree, when in reality he held only a high school diploma.325
When his employer discovered the lie, it terminated him.326 Gilty sued,
alleging racial discrimination.327 Although the position did not require
a bachelor’s degree, the Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of the city:
“[T]he point [was] not that Gilty needed, but did not have, a bachelor’s

315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.

Id. at 455, 471–72.
Id. at 462–63.
Id.
Id. at 462.
Id.
Id. at 477.
Id.
Id. at 477–78.
Id. at 477–79, 482.
Gilty v. Village of Oak Park, 919 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 1248–49, 1251.
Id. at 1249.
See id.
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degree or master’s degree. The point [was] that he lied.”328 Similarly, in
Williams v. Boorstin,329 the D.C. Circuit rejected a Title VII claim by a
terminated employee, Joslyn Williams, who alleged racial
discrimination but who had falsely represented in the application
process that he had a law degree, a requirement for the position.330 The
court explained that both the lack of credentials and the lying were
independent grounds for dismissal: “The lying itself, also from the
outset, made him an unfit employee of the Library of Congress, wholly
apart from the question of his not being a lawyer or his serving well in
assigned tasks.”331
Many pro-employer decisions stand for the basic proposition that
“an employer is entitled to expect and to require truthfulness and
accuracy from its employees.”332 The Seventh Circuit held it “obvious
that companies must be able to discharge . . . an untruthful
employee.”333 The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that “[f]alse statements
impair the employer’s ability to make sound judgments that may be
important to the employer’s legal, ethical and economic well-being.”334
This line of cases does not, however, stand for the proposition that
any lie justifies termination. To fire an employee for lying on an
employment application or during a pre-employment inquiry, the
misrepresentation must have been both material in the decision to hire
the applicant and directly related to employment duties.335 Officer
Gilty lied to make himself look more qualified for the job.336 Mr.
Williams lied to satisfy the minimum qualifications for his job.337 Both
lies were material. An employer can terminate an employee for

328. Id. at 1251.
329. Williams v. Boorstin, 663 F.2d 109 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
330. Id. at 110–11. In contrast to Gilty, see supra note 328, the job at issue specifically required
a law degree, id. at 110.
331. Id. at 118.
332. EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Serrano v.
Cintas Corp., No. 04-40132, 2008 WL 2512921, at *14 (E.D. Mich. June 19, 2008) (“[B]asic honesty
is an objective qualification for any legitimate position of employment.”).
333. 6 W. Ltd. v. NLRB, 237 F.3d 767, 778 (7th Cir. 2001).
334. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d at 1176.
335. Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409, 414 (6th Cir. 1992).
336. See supra note 325 and accompanying text.
337. See supra note 330 and accompanying text.

LESLIE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

THE GAY PERJURY TRAP

9/16/2021 4:16 PM

63

misrepresenting educational credentials,338 employment history,339 a
medical condition relevant to necessary licensing,340 or violation of the
firm’s fraternization policy.341 Each of these lies relates to the
applicant’s or employee’s qualifications to hold the position at issue.
Lies about sexual orientation do not, as the following discussion
explains.
2. Why Misrepresenting One’s Sexual Orientation Should Not Be a
Fireable Offense. Employees trying to evade the gay perjury trap face
a burden; when deciding employment discrimination cases, “[c]ourts of
law are very fond of the truth and favor it on almost every occasion.”342
Inquiries into sexual orientation, however, represent the exceptional
occasion in which an employer is not necessarily entitled to the truth.
Despite precedent suggesting that those who answer improper
questions dishonestly should not be able to challenge the legality of the
question,343 Title VII should be interpreted in a manner that protects
gay employees’ ability to conceal their sexual orientation. Courts
should hold that Title VII precludes employers from terminating or
disciplining employees for misrepresenting their sexual orientation.
This is true for the following four reasons.
a. Sexual Orientation as Immaterial. Those cases in which courts
held that an employee could be terminated for lying during the
application process are distinguishable from instances in which a gay
employee is terminated for lying about their sexual orientation. The
lies in the former set of cases went to the applicant’s qualifications to
338. See, e.g., Robinson v. U.S. Air Force, 635 F. Supp. 108, 110–11 (D.D.C. 1986) (upholding
termination of employee due to his false claim that he had an M.A. degree on his employment
application).
339. See, e.g., Grier v. Casey, 643 F. Supp. 298, 309 (W.D.N.C. 1986) (explaining while
“[i]ntegrity, honesty, and a concerted effort in one’s duties are legitimate qualifications to demand
of any employer [sic] in any position, whether a corporate President or a postal clerk,” “[t]he
Plaintiff d[id] not have those qualifications,” as the employee had lied on her job application
about having been fired from several previous jobs).
340. See, e.g., Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 802–804, 809 (6th Cir. 1998) (concluding
lying about a medical condition relevant to a license needed to do part of a job justifies
termination).
341. See Gooden v. Ryan’s Rest. Grp., Inc., No. 5:04-CV-179-R, 2007 WL 855326, at *1, *13
(W.D. Ky. Mar. 14, 2007) (concluding lying about violation of fraternization policy justifies
termination).
342. EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1176 n.6 (11th Cir. 2000).
343. See infra note 349.
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hold the job in the first place. It would have been perfectly legal for the
employer to decline to hire the applicant based on the concealed
information. For example, the employer could tell an applicant that she
will not be hired because she does not have the necessary education or
experience.
In contrast, after Bostock, the employer cannot ask applicants
about their sexual orientation in order to classify them as qualified or
unqualified for the job.344 Bostock holds that sexual orientation is not
relevant
to
employment
decisions.345
Consequently,
any
misrepresentation about sexual orientation is immaterial to a hiring
decision, and the employer’s purported reason for firing the employee
could be seen as a pretext for discrimination.
Under general principles of employment discrimination law, after
a plaintiff has proven their prima facie case, they can rebut a defense
that the termination was justified by showing that the employer’s
asserted reason for taking adverse action is pretextual.346 When a Title
VII plaintiff shows that the employer’s stated reason for adverse action
is pretextual, this “can be strong evidence that a defendant has acted
with discriminatory intent.”347 Firing gay employees for concealing
their sexual orientation should be treated as a pretext for termination
based on orientation, not deception.
An employer who takes adverse action upon learning that a
supposedly straight worker is gay is most likely motivated by that
employee’s homosexuality, not by any previous misrepresentations of
heterosexuality. The alleged deception is a red herring. As seen in
344. This was true before Bostock in those states and localities with gay-protective statutes.
See Schoenbaum, supra note 244, at 103.
345. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1741 (2020) (“An individual’s homosexuality
or transgender status is not relevant to employment decisions.”).
346. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49–50 n.3 (2003) (“[After] the employer . . .
articulate[s] a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action . . . . [t]he plaintiff
can still prove disparate treatment by, for instance, offering evidence demonstrating that the
employer’s explanation is pretextual.”); Long v. AT & T Info. Sys., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 188, 200
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“[S]hould the defendant carry this burden [of showing a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action], the plaintiff must then have an opportunity
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant
were not true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.” (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs.
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981))).
347. Woodard v. Fanboy, LLC, 298 F.3d 1261, 1265 (11th Cir. 2002); see Hinson v. Clinch
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 821, 831 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[I]n some Title VII cases ‘it is permissible
for the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of discrimination from the falsity of the employer’s
explanation.’” (citations omitted)).
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Buttino, an employer’s invocation of deception is often a pretext for
implementing a broader anti-gay policy.348 An employee should not be
penalized for giving an untruthful answer to a question that, as the next
section explains, should never have been asked.
b. The Inquiry as Improper. Courts should interpret Title VII to
prevent employers from penalizing gay employees for concealing or
misrepresenting their sexual orientation because any workplaceinitiated questions about sexual orientation are inherently improper.
A discriminatory firm’s request for assurances that job applicants are
heterosexual is inappropriate, and any answers given in response
should not provide the basis for later retribution. The real question is
not why employees lie about their sexual orientation, but why
employers ask.
Many courts, however, have suggested that even if the question
posed is illegal, a person does not have a right to lie with impunity. For
example, in nonemployment contexts, in cases involving questions
about a person’s Communist affiliations, the Supreme Court has
rejected the principle that
a citizen has a privilege to answer fraudulently a question that the
Government should not have asked. Our legal system provides
methods for challenging the Government’s right to ask questions—
lying is not one of them. A citizen may decline to answer the question,
or answer it honestly, but he cannot with impunity knowingly and
willfully answer with a falsehood.349

The Acanfora court asserted, in the employment context, “courts have
sustained discharges of government employees for furnishing false
information pertaining to their qualifications despite the fact that the
government’s questions were considered to be an unwarranted
intrusion into constitutionally protected rights.”350 Even if courts

348. See BUTTINO, supra note 17, at 316–17, 326–27.
349. Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 72 (1969) (upholding a criminal conviction where
the defendant falsely claimed not to be a Communist to the NLRB). Similarly, in a criminal case
dealing with a false filing of a non-Communist affidavit, required to satisfy the Taft-Hartley Act,
the Supreme Court held, “There is no reason for this Court to consider the constitutionality of a
statute at the behest of petitioners who have been indicted for conspiracy by means of falsehood
and deceit to circumvent the law which they now seek to challenge. This is the teaching of the
cases.” Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 866 (1966).
350. Acanfora v. Bd. of Educ., 491 F.2d at 501–02 (citing Rodriguez v. Seamans, 463 F.2d 837
(D.C. Cir. 1972)); Williams v. United States, 434 F.2d 1346, 1354 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (Nichols, J.,
concurring).
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interpret Title VII to forbid employer questions about sexual
orientation, this line of cases would suggest that employees cannot
answer deceptively and, if they do, termination is permissible.
Given the historical use of the gay perjury trap, courts should
interpret Title VII to preclude terminations based on deceptive
answers to inappropriate inquiries into sexual orientation. In other
contexts, courts have recognized the bind that job applicants find
themselves in when asked illegal questions and have sided with the
applicants in discrimination lawsuits. For example, after the Police
Commissioner of Boston fired a police officer for “falsely stat[ing]
certain information about his medical history,” the Massachusetts
Supreme Court in Kraft v. Police Commissioner351 held that a police
“commissioner had no authority to discharge [an officer] for giving
false answers to questions that the commissioner under law had no
right to ask.”352 The justices explained their reasoning in a subsequent
opinion: “Any result other than the one reached in Kraft at best would
have ignored the employer’s unlawful inquiries, and at worst would
have rewarded the employer for them. In either event, employers in
the future would have been encouraged to violate the law.”353 A federal
court interpreting claims brought under the Americans with
Disabilities Act similarly concluded that “an employer that violates its
employees’ rights by asking impermissible questions ought not be able
to base adverse employment decisions on the resulting answers (to
which it was not entitled in the first place).”354
These opinions essentially highlight the problem of the gay perjury
trap. When asked an improper question by a job interviewer—for
example, “Are you gay?”—the gay applicant can do one of two things:
Tell the truth, and risk being the victim of illegal—but difficult to
prove—discrimination, or lie and get the job but face the possibility of
dismissal for dishonesty. As in the decades before Bostock, many
prudent LGB individuals in need of work will lie. That lie should not
be a punishable offense; otherwise the gay perjury trap survives, and,
as the Kraft court noted, employers will essentially have “been
encouraged to violate the law”355—in this case, Title VII.

351.
352.
353.
354.
355.

Kraft v. Police Comm’r, 571 N.E.2d 380, 381 (Mass. 1991).
Id. at 382.
Lysak v. Seiler Corp., 614 N.E.2d 991, 993 (Mass. 1993).
Downs v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 13 F. Supp. 2d 130, 140 (D. Mass. 1998).
Lysak, 614 N.E.2d at 993.
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c. Denial May Not Be a Misrepresentation. Courts also should not
permit employers to terminate or penalize employees who previously
indicated their heterosexuality during the application process, but later
came out as gay, because the prior representation may not have been
an actual lie at the time. Understanding one’s own sexual orientation
is a process for many people. Many employees may not realize they are
gay or bisexual until some time after they have been hired.356 For
example, Frank Buttino did not realize he was gay until he was twentysix years old, two years after he had become an FBI agent.357
Statements by those who are unaware of their sexual orientation at the
relevant time are not lies.
Some gay people may be deceiving themselves about their sexual
orientation. Many otherwise healthy gay people are affected by
internalized homophobia or self-hatred. This is particularly common
for individuals raised in religious institutions that preach
condemnation of homosexuality. Many religions proclaim
homosexuality is a sin. Some continue to decree that gay people are an
affront to God and should be killed.358 Many individuals infected by
such teachings feel shame and try to convince themselves they are
heterosexual. Until a person is ready to accept his true orientation, he
is clearly not ready to discuss his sexual orientation with a job
interviewer or a boss. For this reason, the inability to recognize or
acknowledge one’s sexual orientation should not constitute cause for
termination in the post-Bostock world.
d. Valid Reasons to Misrepresent Sexual Orientation. Finally,
employees should not be punished for untruthful answers to questions
about sexual orientation because some people may realize their sexual
orientation but not acknowledge it publicly for a variety of valid
reasons. First, many gay people are closeted to their friends and
family.359 The decision to conceal one’s sexual orientation may be a

356. See LEINEN, supra note 56, at 16 (“All, however, reported that some time passed (on the
average, ten years) before they actually came to identify this interest as homosexual.”).
357. Cramer, supra note 92; see supra notes 90–117 and accompanying text (discussing the
Buttino case).
358. Ashley Milosevic, The Tides of Transgressions: An Analysis of Defamation and the
Rights of the LGBT Community, 82 ALB. L. REV. 323, 336 (2018) (“Certain religions, such as the
Abrahamic religions, believe homosexuality is a sin, an abomination, or worthy of death.”).
359. LEINEN, supra note 56, at 27 (“One officer who expressed such concerns added that his
greatest single worry was that someone in the precinct would leak the knowledge of his
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matter of self-preservation for those gay people who live where others
are particularly hostile—and sometimes violent—toward gay people.
For many workers, “the threat of forced disclosure means revealing
and explaining a facet of life that they have worked very hard to
conceal for many years.”360 Many gay people feel compelled to conceal
their sexual orientation in order to ensure that they are not disowned
by their families, shunned by their friends, and/or excommunicated
from their churches, mosques, or synagogues. It is not the role of a job
interviewer to force such people to publicly acknowledge their true
sexuality and endure animosity from friends, family, and community.
Second, some employees may consider all aspects of their private
lives off limits to bosses and coworkers. Many people—regardless of
their sexual orientation—are private by nature. They have no desire to
share with an employer details of their lives outside the workplace,
whether it is the fact they take salsa dancing lessons, collect
commemorative plates, or live with their same-sex partner. The forced
disclosure of intimate details of their private lives, especially sexual
orientation, can be unnecessarily stressful for gay individuals.361 If
asked about their sexual orientation, these people may reflexively do
what society has demanded of them since birth—maintain their
privacy, which creates presumptive heterosexuality.362
Third, some job applicants may rightly conceal their sexual
orientation because they believe if they volunteer the information, the
employer will discriminate against them. Even in the aftermath of
Bostock, many employers will want to discriminate against employees
and job applicants perceived to be gay. This may be a function of
unofficial corporate policy or an individual interviewer’s or
supervisor’s prejudice, and it provides a powerful incentive for gay
workers to conceal their sexual orientation.363 In fact, studies report a
homosexuality to an unsuspecting member of his family.”). Indeed, some may be married to a
member of the opposite sex. These are often the same people who were raised in anti-gay religious
traditions.
360. Brad S. Weinstein, A Right with No Remedy: Forced Disclosure of Sexual Orientation
and Public “Outing” Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 811, 824 (2005).
361. Arnault, supra note 257, at 785 (“Forced disclosure of sexual orientation is potentially
damaging for a homosexual. The reverse is seldom true for a heterosexual.”).
362. See LEINEN, supra note 56, at 57.
363. This is the great dilemma that many job applicants, including law students, face when
drafting their resumes: to be out or not to be out. A resume can implicitly communicate one’s
sexual orientation if the applicant has held a leadership position in a gay student organization or
has worked for a gay rights group. (Of course, many straight people also work for such
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majority of LGBT employees feel compelled to conceal their LGBT
identity at work.364 Many gay individuals lead bifurcated lives in which
they are open with their friends but closeted to their bosses and
colleagues. These people do not conceal their sexual orientation to pad
their resumes or make themselves look more qualified than they are;
they conceal their sexual orientation to avoid invidious discrimination.
Further, some gay people may perceive the need to lie about their
sexual orientation at work to avoid discrimination in other aspects of
their lives, such as their eligibility to adopt children.365
Fourth, even after a gay person has secured a position with an
employer, they may decide to conceal their sexual orientation to avoid
uncomfortable situations, including being the target of ostracism,
taunting, or even physical violence.366 On-the-job harassment against
gay employees extends from “‘a seemingly endless stream of
homosexual jokes and anti-gay slurs’ to . . . vandalism and threats of
violence directed toward openly gay people on the job.”367

organizations and may incorrectly be labeled as “gay.”) Some students may worry that if they
include such gay-oriented affiliations on their resumes, prejudiced employers will not interview
them. (Others may conclude that if the employer is prejudiced, they would rather not work for
that employer anyway, so nothing is lost by being out on one’s resume.) The omission, however,
does a disservice to the gay job applicant whose resume does not demonstrate the full set of
leadership abilities or other skills that the person has developed. Nevertheless, if the job applicant
decides that it is wiser—especially in a down economy—to omit these experiences, the omission
should not provide the basis for adverse action should the employer later discover the employee’s
involvement with such organizations.
364. HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN FOUND., DEGREES OF EQUALITY: A NATIONAL STUDY
EXAMINING
WORKPLACE
CLIMATE
FOR
LGBT
EMPLOYEES
5
(2009),
https://assets2.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/DegreesOfEquality_2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LNF7GY7].
365. See LESLIE COOPER & PAUL CATES, ACLU LESBIAN & GAY RTS. PROJECT, TOO
HIGH A PRICE: THE CASE AGAINST RESTRICTING GAY PARENTING 42 (2005); see also Cynthia
R. Mabry, Opening Another Exit from Child Welfare for Special Needs Children – Why Some Gay
Men and Lesbians Should Have the Privilege to Adopt Children in Florida, 18 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 269, 285 (2005) (“[S]ome gay and lesbian prospective parents intentionally conceal their
sexual orientation for fear that their opportunity to adopt a child will be denied.”). See generally
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1882 (2021) (finding that the city’s refusal to
contract with a Catholic-affiliated foster agency that discriminated against same-sex couples
violates the agency’s First Amendment rights).
366. See MICHELANGELO SIGNORILE, OUTING YOURSELF: HOW TO COME OUT AS
LESBIAN OR GAY TO YOUR FAMILY, FRIENDS, AND COWORKERS 137–54 (1995).
367. Gregory B. Lewis, Gay Issues in the Workplace, 55 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 201, 201 (1995)
(book review).
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This is a particular risk in police departments.368 In many locations,
the anti-gay prejudice within police departments is deep-seated.369 This
compels gay officers to conceal their sexual orientation even when gayinclusive antidiscrimination policies are in place.370 Once their
homosexuality becomes known at work, police officers are treated
worse by their commanding officers and supervisors.371 For example,
when his fellow officers in New York’s Nassau County Police
Department learned he was gay, one officer was subjected to constant
torment, ranging from being called a child molester and having his
uniform and equipment hidden to having “[h]is colleagues put rocks in
the hub caps of his police car so that criminals would hear his noisy
approach.”372 In some departments, gay police officers feel compelled
to conceal their sexual orientation at work because their homophobic
coworkers may not provide back up in life-threatening situations.373
Gay teachers, too, may still find it necessary to conceal their sexual
orientation to avoid daily harassment from coworkers, students, and
parents.374 Tommy Schroeder was driven to quit his job as a school
teacher after students regularly called him a “faggot” in the hallways,
made harassing phone calls while chanting “faggot, faggot, faggot” at
him, and slashed his car tires; this occurred while the students’ parents
falsely accused him of being a pedophile, and Schroeder’s supervisors
did nothing to protect him.375 Harassment of gay teachers is sufficiently
common and cruel that discretion is a matter of self-preservation in
many regions of the country.

368. See LEINEN, supra note 56, at 35 (noting one gay police officer found “the word Beware
was written on his personal car while it was parked in a police parking lot”).
369. See id. at 8.
370. Id. at 2, 14; see also David Alan Sklansky, Not Your Father’s Police Department: Making
Sense of the New Demographics of Law Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1209, 1222–
23 (2006) (“Even today, gay and lesbian officers can feel strong pressures to keep their sexual
orientation hidden, or at least unadvertised. This is particularly true for gay male officers.”).
371. See, e.g., Lathrop v. City of St. Cloud, No. 10–2361, 2012 WL 185780, at *2 (D. Minn.
Jan. 23, 2012).
372. Quinn v. Nassau Cnty. Police Dep’t, 53 F. Supp. 2d 347, 351 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
373. LEINEN, supra note 56, at 55; cf. id. at 49 (quoting a closeted gay police officer as saying,
“You know cops say real disgusting things like they [gays] should all die or they should be put
away somewhere or something. That closes the door a little more. That sort of solidifies why I
shouldn’t come out” (alteration in original)).
374. See, e.g., Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 948 (7th Cir. 2002); Lovell v.
Comsewogue Sch. Dist., 214 F. Supp. 2d 319, 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
375. Schroeder, 282 F.3d at 948–49.
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Bostock does not change this calculation for gay employees
working in anti-gay police departments, school districts, or many other
workplaces. Most gay workers would rather have a stable job than an
uncertain Title VII lawsuit. As a matter of safety and wellbeing, some
employees may conceal their sexual orientation during the workday.
Given these legitimate reasons for applicants and employees to do so,
and given the illegitimacy of employers’ inquiries about sexual
orientation, courts should recognize that untruthful answers to
employers’ questions about sexual orientation are not valid grounds
for terminating or penalizing employees. This right to prevaricate
should also extend to omitting references to clubs or organizations that
would implicitly disclose applicants’ sexual orientation. Otherwise,
employers could employ the gay perjury trap that ensnared Joseph
Acanfora.376
This recommendation should not be interpreted as encouraging
gay people to stay in the closet. Gay people should come out of the
closet for their own wellbeing, but not because of employer pressure.
LGB individuals should be out. It is better for the person, the gay
community, and society.377 Many gay employees hate having to
misrepresent their sexual orientation at work and find the subterfuge
causes stress, anxiety, and depression.378 But, at the same time, it would
be wrong to overlook the utility of the closet as a temporary or
situational means of avoiding discrimination. Passing lets the gay
individual get a foot in the door. The bisexual man, for example, can
prove himself a valuable employee and disprove the stereotypes and
fallacies used to deny opportunities to gay people. After all, the
irrationality of the military’s anti-gay policies was proven by gay
service members who served valiantly.379 American workplaces should
never adopt policies of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell. Instead, they should
follow a different rule: Don’t Ask, But Employees Are Free to Tell.

376. See supra notes 119–148 and accompanying text. Of course, no job applicant should be
allowed to falsely claim membership in a club or organization to which they do not belong. That
comes close to professing a credential that one does not possess, which is a legitimate reason for
termination. See supra notes 325–334 and accompanying text.
377. See Steve W. Cole, Margaret E. Kemeny, Shelley E. Taylor & Barbara R. Visscher,
Elevated Physical Health Risk Among Gay Men Who Conceal Their Homosexual Identity, 15
HEALTH PSYCH. 243, 243–51 (1996).
378. Lewis, supra note 367, at 202.
379. See Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884, 897–909 (C.D. Cal.
2010).
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C. Precluding Penalties for Employees Refusing to Answer Questions
About Sexual Orientation
In the pre-Bostock era, some courts held that an employee’s
refusal to reveal their sexual orientation when asked was grounds for
termination. Most notably, the courts in Walls380 and Truesdale381 held
that an employee could be penalized for declining to answer questions
related to sexual orientation on an employer’s questionnaire. Both
courts, however, relied on sodomy statutes.382 Now that private sexual
conduct between consenting adults is constitutionally protected and
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation is illegal, the
legal premise that refusal to answer questions about sexual orientation
warrants termination has evaporated.383
Post-Bostock, job applicants and employees should be able to
decline to answer employers’ inquiries about their sexual orientation.
The inquiry is improper and should be considered presumptive
evidence of discrimination under Title VII. Post-Bostock Title VII is
premised on the fact that sexual orientation is irrelevant to job
performance.384 By analogy, Title VII would not tolerate a job
applicant being rejected for declining to tell an employer their
complete racial background. Even in those circumstances in which an
employer is allowed to ask,385 the employee cannot be punished for
refusing to answer.
In addition to being able to rebuff discussions of her sexual
orientation, the job applicant should still retain the right to prevaricate.
The right to refuse to answer, alone, is insufficient. Some courts have
suggested that the refusal to answer invasive personal questions does
not give rise to a cause of action for illegal termination because one’s
privacy is not invaded if one refuses to provide the private
information.386 Such reasoning fails to appreciate the context in which
the improper question is asked. Refusing to answer a question—even

380. Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 193 (4th Cir. 1990).
381. Truesdale v. Univ. of N.C., 371 S.E.2d 503, 509 (N.C. Ct. App 1988).
382. See supra notes 269–275 and accompanying text.
383. See supra notes 269–280 and accompanying text.
384. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1741 (2020) (“An individual’s homosexuality
or transgender status is not relevant to employment decisions.”).
385. Generally, an employer should not make such inquiries, but these are permissible for
EEOC record-keeping purposes and voluntary affirmative action plans. See supra note 245.
386. Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 431 N.E.2d 908, 910 (Mass. 1982).
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an illegal one—can make a job applicant appear evasive and
combative.387 Any employer who is inclined to ask questions about
homosexuality would probably interpret the refusal to answer as an
admission.388 More importantly, it would be exceedingly difficult to
prove that one would have gotten the job but for the refusal to answer
the inappropriate question. The closet is both a prison and a shield. For
all the damage that the closet inflicts, gay individuals should be able to
strategically deploy the closet to avoid unlawful discrimination.
CONCLUSION
Truthfulness is generally considered to be a virtue—but not when
an honest answer would trigger illegal, but challenging to prove,
discrimination. Depending on the context, mendacity can have utility.
In some circumstances, an early deception can expose the false
premises of anti-gay policies. We know that the FBI’s assertion that
gay people cannot be outstanding agents was erroneous precisely
because gay Americans—like Frank Buttino—concealed their sexual
orientation, evaded the FBI’s anti-gay policy, and became exemplary
agents.
Historically, however, major employers have sought to prevent
gay people from disproving the false underpinnings of anti-gay policies
by concealing their sexual orientation to get hired and then performing
exceptionally. In the pre-Bostock era, public and private employers
exploited the gay perjury trap to fire or penalize gay employees for
lying about their sexual orientation. Prejudiced employers focused on
the lie precisely because the gay employees had performed their jobs
well and could not be fired on the merits.
The Bostock opinion will not end workplace discrimination
against gay employees. Many employers, managers, and supervisors
who harbor anti-gay views will continue to discriminate against gay
workers in ways big and small. Some may try to resurrect the gay
perjury trap. Federal authorities must be prepared to blunt these
efforts. The EEOC has a major role to play. It should pursue
complaints of employees being penalized for concealing or
misrepresenting their sexual orientation. Although federal courts are
387. Prior to Lawrence, job applicants may have enjoyed a Fifth Amendment right to refuse
to answer questions about gay conduct because, where such activity was illegal, the admission of
homosexual conduct would be self-incriminating. But exercising this right would hardly endear
the applicant to the interviewer.
388. See supra notes 179–195 and accompanying text.
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the ultimate arbiters of the breadth of Title VII, EEOC decisions can
protect individual employees who face discrimination and can
influence judicial interpretations of Title VII.
Judges, too, should recognize how homophobic employers have
historically set and utilized the gay perjury trap as a way to discriminate
against gay job applicants and workers. At no point should employers
be able to use an employee’s concealment or discretion about their
sexual orientation as a justification for termination, demotion, or any
other adverse action. Federal judges should interpret Title VII to
preclude both inquiries about sexual orientation and penalties for
concealing one’s gay status. Otherwise, the gay perjury trap will survive
the Bostock opinion. And gay workers will lack genuine protection
from invidious discrimination.
The post-Bostock Title VII cannot succeed if employers can use
alleged dishonesty about sexual orientation as a means of justifying
anti-gay discrimination and of avoiding liability. Courts should not fall
for the distraction. The relevant question is not “Why did the applicant
lie?”, but “Why did the employer ask?”

